SAN MATEO COUNTY
COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT

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PUBLIC SAFETY MANAGEMENT STUDY AND

SAFETY & SECURITY PROGRAM ASSESSMENT

OCTOBER 2017

FINAL DRAFT

MARGOLIS HEALY®
SOLUTIONS FOR SAFE CAMPUSES®

SAN MATEO COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT
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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION & PROJECT SCOPE

The Colleges of the San Mateo County Community College District (SMCCCD or the District), Cañada College, College of San Mateo, and Skyline College, recognizing each individual's right to education, provide the occasions and settings which enable students to develop their minds and their skills, engage their spirits, broaden their understanding of social responsibilities, increase their cultural awareness and realize their individual potential. In support of this mission, SMCCCD retained Margolis Healy & Associates (Margolis Healy or MHA) to conduct a comprehensive review and analysis of how the Department of Public Safety is positioned to respond to the variety of issues associated with ensuring campus safety, including catastrophic events such as natural disasters and active threats to the campus community. This study also includes an examination of practices in campus safety at like-situated institutions (please see the Research Report for detailed information regarding the benchmark group), with the goal of determining if there are additional measures the District should consider to further maintain and enhance safety and security on all SMCCCD campuses.

No single event or incident at the District or at the Colleges, or at other colleges or universities in the United States, prompted this review. The Board of Trustees commissioned this study in light of several critical incidents, including targeted violence, that have occurred during the recent years on campuses across the nation, and the Board's recognition of their fundamental duty to ensure a reasonably safe environment for all SMCCCD community members and visitors to the campuses.

The Report is intended to serve three general purposes. First, we organize the observations and recommendations to provide District leadership with an objective assessment of the current state of the operations of the Public Safety Department and other related campus security practices and protocols, along with prioritized recommendations to address any gaps in line with promising and evolving best practices. Second, leadership can use the observations to understand specific areas of structure, policy and practice they should address, and the order in which they should address gaps. Finally, this Report can provide the SMCCCD community with an understanding of the orientation and functional success of the District's safety and security initiatives and opportunities for improvement.

ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

This Report is presented in a chapter format with six major parts. Section I includes the Methodology, including an explanation of our process for identifying major themes and cross tabulating results from multiple one-on-one, small group, and open forum sessions. Section II outlines the Major Theme identified during our assessment, with Section III and IV addresses specific observations and recommendations from the primary and secondary focus areas. Section V includes the recommendations, in a Master List and a Matrix that includes our opinions about criticality and cost of each recommendation. Finally, Section VI includes various attachments, including team bios, etc.

DISCLAIMER AND DISCLOSURE

Margolis Healy & Associates conducted this assessment and prepared this report at the request of SMCCCD. The authors' opinions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations are provided solely for the use and benefit of SMCCCD. Any warranties (expressed and/or implied) are specifically disclaimed. Any statements, allegations, and recommendations in this report should not be construed as a governing policy, or decision, unless so designated by other documentation. The report is based on the most accurate data gathered and available to Margolis Healy & Associates at the time of the assessment and presentation. Our recommendations might be subject to change in light of changes in such data.

SECTION I – METHODOLOGY

Margolis Healy & Associates, LLC, conducted a Public Safety Management Study™ (PSMS™) of the SMCCCD Department of Public Safety by becoming familiar with the Department's operational strategy and its alignment with SMCCCD's mission (http://smccd.edu/aboutus/mission.php), organizational structure to support this strategy, and staffing to meet strategic and operational goals and community expectations. Our assessment of these areas is intended to provide a reasonable foundation from which to make key decisions ranging from the campus safety model, department orientation and strategy, resource allocation and overall safety and security policies and procedures.

MHA Partners Steven J. Healy and Daniel Pascale led the individual teams conducting the assessments at the Colleges and facilitating the open forums. For additional information about the MHA team composition, please refer to Attachment 7.

During our visits, we conducted interviews with a wide range of constituents, including students, faculty, staff members, members of the administration, and College and District leadership. Our meetings with SMCCCD community members included a mix of one-on-one and forum sessions. In addition to the forum sessions conducted during the College visits, we also conducted five Open Forums at all of the Colleges over a three-day span during the middle of September. The District directed these forums to ensure that those who wanted to provide feedback would have an opportunity to do so. During the forums, attendees openly engaged and willingly shared their opinions about the state of campus security, their perceptions about the Public Safety Department, and their heart-felt opinions about a possible transition to an armed campus safety department. In addition to the open forums, we established an anonymous method for individuals to provide input to for this assessment. During the site visits to the Colleges, we also conducted "Visioning Sessions," designed to solicit input from key administrators on issues related to campus safety and security. The results from this session are included at Attachment 6.

During our on campus visits, the Margolis Healy team conducted over 78 separate interviews, meeting with over 250 students and employees representing various functional areas and student affiliations. 55 SMCCCD affiliates attended the 15 open forums conducted at the three Colleges. Finally, we received 703 separate entries into the "Google Doc" anonymous feedback form.

To identify the Major Themes for this review, we cross-referenced the feedback from the *one-on-one interviews, forum sessions, anonymous feedback from the Google Doc,* and *comments made during the Visioning Session,* with concerns we identified during our assessment of policies, procedures, and operational practices. Given the number of feedback mechanisms established by the District, we received feedback in four (4) separate ways. Where participants raised an issue three or more times, we further explored that concern to determine if it rose to the level of a major theme. Most often, if participants raised an issue three or more times, it aligned with a concern that the team had independently identified. Because we assessed the District and the individual College's policies and practices against acceptable, promising and reasonable practices in campus safety and security, the gap analysis is an organic outcome of our review. For example, when interviewees cited a concern about the lack of officer visibility, *and* it was repeated three or more times, we noted it as an area requiring additional exploration. We then conducted additional verification to understand the Department's patrol strategy and reached internal consensus on whether the issue rose to the level of a significant challenge. Because we received feedback from multiple constituent groups in several different venues, we are able to triangulate concerns with a relatively high degree of certainty.

We base our recommendations on best and evolving promising practices in higher education safety and security and draw from our experience, our work from other similarly situated institutions, and our on-going exploration of the campus security landscape. For this Report, we note each recommendation with the following annotations:

- Urgency of Recommendation (UoR): This annotation addresses our professional opinion regarding the criticality of the recommendation. Because our overall goal is to assist the District with adopting best and/or promising practices in campus safety and security, we only make high impact recommendations. We recognize, however, that the District does not have unlimited resources, and that some recommendations are more important than others. **Immediate (I)** means the District should initiate the action now, and no later than the next 60 days; **Mid-Term (M)** means the District should take the action within the next 60 – 120 days; and finally, **Long-Term (L)** means the District should consider fully implementing the action post-120 days, but no later than one year following final acceptance of the Report.

- Confidence of Recommendation (CoR): **High (H)** means that, in our professional opinion, if the District adopts the recommendation, it is highly likely that the action will close the gap between the

contemporary standard and the current practice. **Medium (M)** means that the action will *likely* close the gap, while **Low (L)** means that the recommendation *may* address the gap, but is dependent on other unpredictable factors.

- Resource Implications and Budget Impact (RI): This refers to our educated estimate regarding the resources needed to fully implement the recommendation. **Substantial (S)** implies a significant investment on the District's part; **Routine (R)** means the District should consider the cost a routine cost of maintaining a highly professional and competent campus safety department; and **Negligible (N)** means the recommendation should have minimal impact on the District's budget.

Taken together, the scales should provide a reasonable foundation for making critical decisions about the next steps regarding the Recommendations.

SECTION II – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND MAJOR THEMES

The San Mateo County Community College District's Board of Trustees directed staff to review evolving best and promising practices in campus safety and security, with the intent of identifying additional measures the District should consider to further enhance safety at the Colleges. Our review, then, is a comprehensive assessment of several areas having direct and indirect impacts on campus safety and security. While much of our review focused on policy related issues, we also examined the physical layout of the campuses to identify physical security practices that impact overall safety and security.

It was clear to us during this review that the District's leadership is deeply committed to the safety of the campus community. Beginning with the *Management & Policing Consulting, LLC* Organizational Assessment of Security Operations commissioned in 2008, District leadership and the Board of Trustees have taken positive, incremental steps to address gaps in the security program. We believe the hiring of the new director, William Woods, represents a significant move in the right direction and provides the District with an experienced professional to lead the campus safety efforts. Consolidating management operations at the District likewise represented an appropriate step towards functional coordination, standardization, and efficiency. Finally, we were impressed with the efforts the District has taken to leverage security technology to enhance campus safety. The addition of security cameras, access control systems, and the public address system all represent reasonable security measures that contribute to a comprehensive security program.

In keeping with our overall goal of identifying additional measures the District should consider, we determined that the District should further examine several areas related to safety and security to continuously improve the overall security environment. These include developing contemporary policies and procedures for the campus safety operation; implementing an actionable strategy for engaging with the campus community, especially students; enhancing the physical security program by leveraging available security technology; and providing immediate action response training to campus members to prepare them to respond to critical incidents.

Our assessment leads us to believe that the campus safety enterprise at the District could benefit from increased staffing. For example, the director has no command staff to assist him in managing the operations of a multiple college District. While the three individual College "chiefs"

provide some command level support to the Director, we believe that their primary focus should be on managing the campus safety operations at their designated College, leaving a gap in administrative and operational support for the Director. Additionally, the District does not have a dispatch operation, an anomaly in comparison to SMCCCD peers. We examine additional ways the District can fulfill this need. We believe that the District must invest in an actionable strategy to engage with the campus community and enhance Public Safety's image. This initiative is likely to require additional capacity. Finally with respect to additional staffing at the District level, the Public Safety Department does not have an investigative capacity and we recommend the addition of at least one trained, experienced investigator to manage and conduct investigations at the Colleges. While we recognize the resource implications of these recommendations, we believe that additional capacity would further enhance campus safety and security.

Finally, we make what we believe are high impact recommendations, including transitioning to a sworn college police department and the eventual provision of firearms to qualified, appropriately trained and vetted District officers. We outline the rationale for this recommendation in the section below entitled "Role and Mission."

Below, we outline the major themes emerging from this assessment, and further explore them in Section III, Specific Observations.

MAJOR THEMES

During our assessment, we identified several major themes. Below, we provide a brief summary of the major themes, and address them in detail in the Specific Observations section of this report.

Priority #1: Clarify Role, Mission, Strategy

We found wide variation within the SMCCCD community regarding the perceptions of the role of the Public Safety Department, as well as expectations for what officers should do or be capable of doing. Clearly this assessment is intended to provide the context for clarifying these important points and it is extremely important to understand the various expectations from segments of the campus community.

Campus safety departments exist along a spectrum between full service police departments, similar to municipal police agencies, and highly service-oriented departments functioning primarily as community caretakers in a "observe and report" role. Ultimately, while institutions have the responsibility for determining the model of campus safety best suitable for their environment, they should consider in their analysis

regional and national trends, standards, and practices regarding adequate responses to threats and vulnerabilities. Institutions should also account for campus community expectations when considering these important decisions. It was clear to us from the Open Forums, the anonymous feedback, and our smaller group meeting that campus members have high expectations for Public Safety ranging from a desire for more visible officers to their ability to respond to a full range of incidents including medical emergencies and rapidly unfolding violent incidents. In our professional opinion, there are currently gaps between campus expectations and Public Safety capabilities, and the District should decide on meeting or modifying these expectations.

Priority #2: Develop a Written Directive System

The Public Safety Department does not have an adequate set of written directives (policies, procedures, formal protocols) capable of providing appropriate guidance to line-level supervisors and officers. A written directive system is fundamental and critical to mitigating risks associated with campus safety and security and ensuring consistency across the Colleges.

Priority #3: Develop a Strategy for Engaging with the Campus Community

Universally, District community members expressed their desire for more positive interactions with public safety officers. We heard comments like "we never see them;" "I don't understand what they do;" "I only see them when they're writing parking tickets;" and "I don't know any officers by name."

We determined that the Department does not, in fact, have a strategy for engaging with the campus community, and until recently, had not even considered the need for such a strategy. Given the state of police-community relations in this country, and the need for the public safety department to be viewed as a partner in the co-production of campus safety, this strategy is of primary importance. This strategy should be informed by the national landscape and carried out by officers who acknowledge and understand its need, and who are able to embrace a community policing approach to campus safety. Frankly, we are not sure that this orientation has been a primary focus in the hiring process and the department will need to include this as an important competency moving forward.

In our view, the District must make this a primary short-term goal and we believe that the delivery of immediate action response training (IART) can be the centerpiece of this strategy.

Priority #4: Develop a Comprehensive Physical Security Program

We commend the District for its investment in and deployment of security systems and technology. We found in many cases however, that the District has approached these initiatives as individual solutions rather than part of an overall strategy. We believe the District should develop a comprehensive physical security program that weaves together the various technological and mechanical countermeasures to create redundancy and concentric circles of protection.

Priority #5: Enhance Emergency Management Planning

SMCCCD has worked to develop an all-hazards emergency operations plan consistent with contemporary standards in higher education and we applaud these efforts. We believe, however that the District and the Colleges can do more to enhance training and familiarization with the plan. While the District has adopted "The Big Five" immediate actions for critical incident response, we heard concerns from faculty, staff and students indicating a desire for additional training in emergency response including lockdown, evacuation, and drop, cover and hold. We believe this is an area the District can and should focus its planning efforts at the College level as well as the District offices. We also believe that this focus can have ancillary benefits in building positive relationships with the campus community.

SECTION III – PRIMARY FOCUS AREAS

1. ROLE AND MISSION

Observations

Campus safety departments exist along a spectrum between full service police departments, similar to municipal police agencies, and those that function primarily as community caretakers, with an "observe and report" mission.

Campus Safety Model Spectrum

- Contract, non-sworn, unarmed security dept.
- Serve in an "Observe & Report" role
- Training varies according to state (security guard) and/or institutional requirements

- Proprietary, non-sworn, unarmed security dept.
- Serve in an "Observe & Report" role
- Training varies according to state (security guard) and/or institutional requirements

- Proprietary, non-sworn,
- Armed or unarmed security dept.
- Comprehensive training program, above state minimums
- Quasi-law enforcement authority, perhaps through MOU or other agreement

- Proprietary, limited law enforcement authority
- Armed or unarmed, perhaps hybrid
- Perform limited law enforcement functions
- Comprehensive training, perhaps attending some formal entry level academy
- Some specialized functions

- Sworn, armed (usually a hybrid department)
- Accredited
- Specialized units

In our professional opinion, the District has not reached consensus on where the Department should sit on this spectrum. It also appears that District community members are likewise confused about the Department's capabilities, often expressing during our sessions unrealistic expectations regarding officer's ability to respond to various types of incidents (see Attachment 4: Google Doc Anonymous Feedback re: "Response Expectations"). For example, Open Forum participants often shared that they would call Public Safety if there were a violent incident occurring on campus; this sentiment is also repeated in the anonymous feedback. Likewise, we heard examples of instructors summoning officers to classroom disruptions, yet officers have not received verbal de-escalation training to effectively respond to such an incident nor are they equipped to appropriately respond if that incident involved a dangerous weapon.

Based on this role confusion and campus community expectations, the Department constantly faces a conundrum with respect to where on the spectrum the District expects it to operate. Our sense is that the District and its members want the unit to move along this spectrum depending on the circumstances at hand. In reality, however, the Department is trained, empowered, and equipped to only operate on the far left side of this model, with little capacity to respond beyond an "observe and report manner."

Finally, the District has uniformed and partially equipped officers so they look exactly like police officers, and this appears to add to the confusion about roles and expectations.

In our opinion, the District should immediately clarify the Department's fundamental role and responsibilities (please see Attachment 2 – "Role and Mission Statement" as a starting point for an official mission statement). The Department should then develop mission and vision statements and core values (aligned with SMCCCD's Mission Statement) to support this role. Each department member should know and understand the Department's mission, vision, and core values and they should be imbedded in each activity it undertakes, including interactions with the campus members. The development of the vision statement and core values should be an inclusive process involving as many Department members and key stakeholders from the Colleges as possible.[1,2]

In our opinion, the Department would be much better oriented, trained, and prepared to meet District and community expectations as well as known, widely-acknowledged and emerging threats if it was a Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) certified police department, similar to the majority of community college districts in the Bay Area and in Northern California (please refer to the Research Report for additional benchmarking information).

[1] Orrick, D. (2005). Smaller Police Department Technical Assistance Guide (IACP/BJA)

[2] Police Executive Research Foundation. (2007). "Good to Great" Policing: Application of Business Management Principles in the Public Sector. Washington, DC: Wexler, C. Wycoff, M.A. and Fischer, C.

Figure 2: Bay Area 10 Campus Safety Models

Bay Area 10 - Campus Safety Model

Figure 3: Selected Northern California Community College Districts Campus Safety Model

We base this opinion on several factors, including the fact that POST trained officers receive the necessary foundational training and education to prepare them to respond to a wide range of safety, security, and law enforcement issues, *and* have on-going access to POST training, as well as requirements for completing specified training.

Currently, many SMCCCD officers have minimal training (see Attachment 3 for current public safety officer entry level training requirements).[3] Of the 18-fulltime staff members, 10 have never obtained a POST certification.[4] Of the remaining eight who have obtained a certification during their careers, three of these have expired[5], which means that the individual has had at least a three year break in

[3] SMCCCD recently changed its entry-level qualifications to require POST certification. This new requirement ensures that all new officers have attended the Regular Basic Course for Peace Officers. This change does not affect the officer's legal authority.

[4] This means the individual has been awarded a POST Basic Certificate which is a professional certificate awarded by POST to individuals who have completed a Basic Course and who have served as a full-time peace officer and minimally completed 12 months of probation. During the 12 months of probation, the individual is required to complete the agency's Field Training program or Police Training program).

[5] Those officers whose certifications have expired may be permitted to attend a 136-hour requalification program to re-qualify their training.

employment as a law enforcement officer. In terms of law enforcement training, three years is a significant amount of time, as the skills taught in the academy are highly perishable, which is one reason why POST mandates additional on-going training in the form of "in-service" training. The training levels for the 10 officers who have never attended the regular police academy varies by individual, but minimally they have received 32 hours of security guard training, not nearly enough training to prepare officers for operating as a campus safety officer. As noted in the section on Training and Career Development, the department did not, at the time of our visit, have a suitable orientation or field training program, which means these officers are inadequately prepared to perform the range of complex tasks required of a campus safety officer in the 21st Century, such as verbal de-escalation, interacting with individuals in the midst of a mental health crisis, cultural competency (we are aware that the department has provided some training in this areas post-site visits), search and seizure, patrol operations and use of force.

The second factor driving our recommendation to transition to a sworn agency is the fact that sworn officers in a law enforcement agencies have the legal authority to undertake a range of actions, many of which are fundamental to maintaining a safe campus environment. These actions include detaining individuals to conduct legitimate investigations, applying for and executing search and arrest warrants, enforcing vehicle and traffic laws, and using force in situations that may require it. Currently, SMCCCD officers have limited legal authority to respond to many incidents that may occur on campus, including searching an individual who may be causing a disturbance in a classroom, investigating a "suspicious activity" call or arresting someone who have committed a crime. For example, we learned during our visits that "suspicious person or activity" calls make up a significant percentage of calls received by Public Safety. Under the current rubric, public safety officers have limited authority to investigate these types of calls and must rely on the local police for assistance (criminal record, warrants, ability to detain, etc.). Relying on the local police for these types of routine calls significantly impedes the Department's ability maintain campus safety.

We further believe that the District should consider a "hybrid" campus safety model, with both sworn and non-sworn officers, appropriately trained to meet corresponding expectations. This is the predominant model in place at many institutions of higher education and acknowledges the reality that a college police department is likely to have security, community caretaking, and law enforcement responsibilities. Retaining

non-sworn officers dedicated primarily to the "security" mission of the department allows the District to specifically hire and train those officers for the tasks for which they are responsible.

This model is not only the predominant model used at SMCCCD peer institutions, but we believe it also significantly increases the District's ability to enhance safety and security, addresses gaps in training and response capacity identified during our assessment and through feedback from District community members, and creates a clear guidepost for hiring officers who are best suited for providing campus safety services at the Colleges.

In addition to the training and legal authority, having a POST-certified police department[6] offers many other benefits to the District, some of which are outlined in the chart below.

Chart 1: Sworn vs. Non-Sworn Agencies

SWORN AGENCIES	NON-SWORN AGENCIES
Legal Authority granted through legislation	Institutional Authority (basically same as landlord)
Access to free/low-cost training at all levels, including recruit, in-service, and specialized	Limited training availability, and generally at a high cost
Relative independence to manage law enforcement investigations aligned with District's values	Relies on local law enforcement for investigations; limited ability to dictate direction
Authority to act in civil/non-law enforcement situations (self-harm; protective custody; mental health crisis)	No authority to commit/detain someone in midst of mental health crisis
Full access to law enforcement information/ intelligence regarding terrorism (NCIC, JTTF, etc.)	No access unless on relationship bases
Possibility of allegations of disparate treatment if campus members treated differently from visitors (campus member referred for internal action vs. visitor arrested)	No legal authority means most treated the same, although there is some potential for disparate treatment by proxy.
Viewed as "law enforcement partner" with a seat at the table	Dependent on relationships
Greater Legitimacy (perception varies widely especially with people of color)	Generally viewed as "security guards," with little legitimacy.
Greater Liability, esp. w/regards to use of force.	Liability exist, but not at same levels.

Transitioning from the current security model to a police department should be relatively seamless given that the department currently employs some officers who already have or can obtain a POST Basic Certificate. Obviously, the District would need to make decisions about various personnel related issues, such as potential reclassification for certain positions and associated salary adjustments (see Chart 2 below). Additionally, the Department would have to meet other POST requirements such as implementing a field training program and developing the requisite polices and procedures to govern police operations. Nonetheless, we believe this transition could occur within a 6 – 12 month period.

[6]The California Penal Code gives Community Colleges the authority to establish their own police departments.

Chart 2: SMCCCD Current Staff Certifications

San Mateo County Community College District
Current Staff Certifications

LEGEND:
POST – CA Peace Officer Standards & Training Commission
CCW – Concealed Carry Permit
PFT – Permanent Full-Time
PPT – Permanent Part-Time

Individual #	College	Type	POST Certification	POST Status	CCW	Previous Law Enforcement Experience
1	All	Exempt	Yes	Current	Yes	San Diego PD (Retired)
2	CSM	Exempt	Yes	Expired	Yes	Millbrae PD (Retired)
3	CAN	Exempt	No	POST Basic Course	Yes	Academy Only; Contra Costa Academy (CCW through SMSO)
4	SKY	Exempt	Yes	Expired	Yes	Millbrae PD (Retired)
LIEUTENANT						
5	All	PFT	No	N/A	No	No Academy/No PD
FULL-TIME OFFICERS						
6	SKY	PFT	No	POST Basic Course	No	Academy only. Former SF Parks
7	CSM	PFT	Yes	Current	Yes	Millbrae PD Reserve/Huron Reserve (Current)
8	All	PFT	No	POST Basic Course	No	Academy Only; Former Brisbane PD
9	SKY	PFT	No	N/A	No	No Academy/No PD
10	SKY	PFT	Yes	Expired	Yes	San Francisco PD (D-Retired)
11	CSM	PFT	No	POST Basic Course	No	Academy Only
12	CSM	PFT	Yes	Current	Yes	UC Police (Retired)
13	CSM	PFT	No	N/A	No	NASA (Armed Security), Former Huron Reserve
14	CAN	PFT	No	N/A	No	No Academy/No PD
15	CSM	PFT	No	N/A	No	No Academy/No PD
16	CAN	PFT	Yes	Current	Yes	Hayward PD/Huron PD (Resigned)
17	SKY	PFT	No	N/A	No	Academy Only
18	SKY	PFT	Yes	Current	Yes	Huron PD (Resigned)
PERMANENT PART-TIME						
19	SKY	PPT	No	N/A		No Academy/No PD. Current Security at SF United
20	SKY	PPT	Yes	Current	Yes	State Parole/US Marshal (Retired); Current PT Security
TEMPORARY PART-TIME						
21	All	Hourly	No	POST Basic Course	No	Academy Only; Current
22	CAN	Hourly	No	N/A	No	No Academy/No PD
23	All	Hourly	Yes	Current	Yes	San Mateo Sheriff Office Reserve (Current)
24	CAN	Hourly	Yes	Current	No	SM County Coroner (Current)
25	CSM	Hourly	Yes	Current	Yes	San Bruno PD (Retired).
26	SKY	Hourly	Yes	Current	Yes	State Parole/US Marshal (Retired)

Total Staff with POST Certification: 13
  Total Active: 10
  Total Expired: 3
  Total PFT Officer: 5
Total CCW: 13

The question regarding the types of equipment that SMCCCD officers should be authorized to carry is obviously much more complicated, although it is a fundamental question that the District asked us to consider. We approach this question by analyzing campus expectations, understanding the evolving campus security landscape, and acknowledging the current state of police-community relations. We believe that an examination of each of these spheres yields important information to answer the equipment question.

Campus Expectations

One of the most important questions regarding how to equip a campus safety agency is what the institution and campus community expects of the officers in terms of response capacity. Does the campus community expect the officers to primarily fulfill an "observe and report" role whereby they response and contact local police for assistance or is there an expectation that they "full-service" and are therefore capable of responding to a wide range of incidents, including those that are potentially violent?

Respondents to the anonymous survey overwhelmingly cited four expectations for District officers: 1) officers should be more visible; 2) Public Safety should engage more often with students; 3) there should be more public safety officers; and 4) officers need more and better training (wide variation on the types of training cited). Campus Forum participants likewise echoed these sentiments as did interviewees during our campus visits, as indicated in the Major Themes portion of this Report.

There are several underlying implications to the consensus expectations that officers are more visible and that they engage more proactively with students. First, we interpret the comments on visibility to imply that individuals would feel safer if officers were more visible, both on campus grounds and in campus facilities. This interpretation tracks with decades old research regarding the impact of foot patrol and officer visibility on fear of crime and sense of security.[7] These expectations should inform the Department's operational and patrol strategy (addressed later in this Report), and also provide additional context regarding how safe individuals feel while they are on campus. Despite the relatively low incidence of reported crime (see the District's Clery Act-required Annual Security Report), many District community members are nonetheless concerned about their personal safety. Herein lies the dilemma. If campus members openly express their concerns for their personal safety, and we agree that the Department needs a

[7]See for example Pate, Experimenting with Foot Patrol, *The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment* (Washington DC: The Police Foundation, 1981.

strategy to address these concerns, the District should consider both the implications of greater officer visibility (more officers, different deployment, etc.) in addition to how officers are trained and equipped to adequately respond to an incident. In our professional opinion, the Department is currently trained, equipped and resourced as an "observe and report" security unit, while it appears that the campus community expects more. Understanding the extent of "more" is the crux of the issue, especially given campus expressions about how officers should be equipped.

A second significant take-away arising from campus expectations is that many District members, and most notably students, want Public Safety to be more engaged with them. This too tracks with research on public safety legitimacy and the need to purposely and consistently undertake initiatives to build substantive relationships with the community being served. Again, there are strategy and orientation implications (addressed in the section entitled Crime Prevention, Safety Awareness, and Community Engagement) and well as practical considerations regarding how the campus community might respond to a transition to a more fully capable police department once this level of engagement is occurring and the Department has established trust-based relationships with the campus community.

The Evolving Campus Security Landscape

Like all communities, higher education institutions experience a myriad of problems and challenges in sustaining a reasonably safe and secure environment. Campuses are workplaces with all of the corresponding safety and security challenges. Faculty, students, staff, contractors and vendors, and visitors, for the most part, assume that campuses are safe enclaves, and give little thought to risk. Theft, domestic violence, assaults and vandalism may happen to a lesser extent on campus, but they happen. To support this assertion, crime statistics collected under the "The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act" and the most recent Bureau of Justice Statistics Campus Law Enforcement Special Report continue to illustrate that university and college campuses are generally safer than the communities where they are located. Yet, the very existence of the Clery Act is evidence that crime does happen on campuses, and that institutions must take proactive steps to prevent these incidents and inform their campus communities of the occurrence of crimes and the prevention measures in place.

All campuses, public and private, small and large and 4 and 2-year institutions, experience the shared challenge of maintaining an open, accessible environment while identifying, preventing, and mitigating risks and vulnerabilities. Heightened efforts center on building capacity to identify, assess, and manage threatening behavior from campus members and visitors, and responding to a wide range of potentially volatile situation.[8] The debate over the best strategies to address risks and vulnerabilities creates new problem-solving challenges for campus administrators.

Beyond physical security challenges, IHEs face a number of critical security issues. At the top of the list are issues related to high-risk drinking and the abuse of illegal and prescription drugs, which has risen dramatically in recent years. Each year, more than 1,600 students die from unintentional alcohol related injuries. The negative outcomes related to alcohol and drug abuse can include poor academic performance, depression, anxiety, suicide, and sexual violence.[9] The problem has reached devastating levels, prompting the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University to state that we are "wasting the best and the brightest."[10] Sexual and gender violence crimes continues to be the most underreported violent crime on college campuses and federal and state governments have increasingly required programmatic measures and increased reporting. The strategies required to successfully change the culture and address these challenges demand a multi-disciplinary approach that focuses on communication, coordination, and collaboration across the institution. While campus safety agencies are at the center of the efforts to address these challenges, many other departments at the institution must fully participate in the efforts.

There is little debate regarding the impact that the rampage shooting incidents at Virginia Tech in April 2007 and Northern Illinois in February 2007 have had on the landscape of campus security. Since those tragedies, universities, colleges, federal, state and local governments, and higher education professional associations have dedicated resources and information to enhance campus safety and security. Against this backdrop, institutions struggle to provide reasonable security on their campuses while maintaining the sense of openness that is a hallmark of the United States higher education experience. A greater recognition of the challenges of protecting the nation's campuses demands an enlightened campus safety approach. To support this approach, campus safety officers must be trained and equipped to deal with a variety of issues both shared with their local and state counterparts, and unique to the campus environment. Community policing and campus engagement

[8]Drysdale, D., Modzeleski, W., and Simons, A. (2010). *Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education*. U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, U.S. Department of Education, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice. Washington, D.C., 2010.

[9]Wasting the Best and the Brightest: Substance Abuse at America's Colleges and Universities The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, (2007), 4 – 6.

[10]Wasting the Best and the Brightest: Substance Abuse at America's Colleges and Universities The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, (2007), 1 – 3.

strategies have taken the forefront as institutions acknowledge the rift between the police and communities, especially communities of color, and recognize the impact this divide may have on campus.

Colleges and universities should continually review and, when necessary, enhance campus security policies and practices to address new and emerging challenges, and to ensure they have adequate resources to address the full spectrum of threats it is likely to face. In our experience, each time there is a major critical incident on a college campus, institutions have paused to consider whether there are other measures it should consider to create or further enhance a reasonably safe campus environment.[11] While the focus of these deliberations is generally on whether the institution is prepared for a targeted violence incident, we suggest a wider lens is not only appropriate, but also required given the complexity of the security risks they face.

While we know that a targeted violence/active shooter situation is a low probability event, we also accept that the possible consequences of such an incident are so high, that to ignore it as a possibility would be irresponsible. We also know from recent research that these types of events have been on a rise for at least the past decade. See for example the "Campus Attacks Report" (a joint federal agency publication)[12] and the "A Study of Active Shooter Incidents 2000 – 2013," published in 2014 by Texas State University, in conjunction with the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice.[13] Both reports establish an increasing frequency of incidents with the FBI A Study of Active Shooter Incidents establishing a significant increase during the last half of the study period to 16.4 incidents annually.

[11] See for example http://wjla.com/news/nation-world/threat-assessment-preparation-can-prevent-college-shooting-desks-experts-say.

[12] Drysdale, D., Modzeleski, W., and Simons, A. (2010). *Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education*. U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, U.S. Department of Education, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice. Washington, D.C., 2010.

[13] Blair, J. Pete, and Schweit, Katherine W. (2014). A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000 - 2013. Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C. 2014.

Figure 4: U.S. Active Shooter Incidents, 2000-2013

A Study of 160 Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 - 2013:
Incidents Annually

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014

Taken from Blair, J. Pete, and Schweit, Katherine W. (2014). A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000 - 2013. Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C. 2014.

These two documents paint a disturbing landscape of what institutions of higher education may face in the near future with respect to targeted violence incidents on school campuses, which according to the 2013 active shooter study is the second most prevalent location where these types of incidents occur (24.4%, behind general commerce locations at 45.6%). One of the most revealing and disturbing findings in the FBI active shooter study is the speed with which these incidents occur.

> A majority of the 160 incidents (90 [56.3%]) ended on the shooter's initiative before the police arrived—sometimes when the shooter committed suicide or stopped shooting, and other times when the shooter fled the scene. In 63 incidents where the duration of the incident could be ascertained, 44 (69.8%) of 63 incidents ended in 5 minutes or less, with 23 ending in 2 minutes or less.[14]

In our professional opinion, the facts related to the speed in which these types of incidents occur has been one of the primary factors that has influenced institution's decisions to transition to a sworn and armed police department over the past several years. For example, when Franklin & Marshall College announced its 2014 decision to arm its sworn police officers, the College President, Daniel Porterfield highlighted the active shooter threat as a primary deciding factor:

[14] Blair, J. Pete, and Schweit, Katherine W. (2014). A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000 – 2013, pg. 21. Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C. 2014.

Franklin & Marshall joins institutions across the country that have gone through a thorough process of research and self-examination and determined that arming sworn officers is appropriate for us, given the quality of our campus safety force and also the situations confronting educational institutions and law enforcement officers today," Porterfield said. "It was, objectively, the quality of our campus police force—its preparedness and its training—combined with my concerns about **the increase of active shooters** and the realities that our officers face today in their off-campus patrols, that prompted me to call the arming question.[15]

Likewise, the president of the Connecticut State Colleges and Universities system cited increased campus safety and situations on other campuses around the nation in his advocacy for recently passed legislation in that state that permits state community colleges to arm their officers.

"Our advocacy on behalf of this bill was generated from students, faculty, and administrators conveying a desire to feel safe on their campuses," Ojakian said. "This conversation was accelerated by the recent tragic events that occurred on college campuses around the country. Providing community colleges the option to have special police forces is part of a larger holistic approach we are undertaking which includes reviewing all of our support services and physical infrastructure to make sure we're doing everything possible to keep our students and staff safe on our campuses."[16]

Finally, student safety was highlighted in a 2015 Northampton Community College Student Senate vote to transition their security department to a full service police department.[17]

As stated earlier, the increase in targeted violence incidents, coupled with the fact that most of these incidents are over within a very short period of time, institutions have considered what they can do to resolve a potential incident as quick as possible, saving lives and ending the violence. In the examples cited above, the institutions decided that having their own trained and appropriately equipped officers was one of the most reasonable measures to addressing the threat of an active shooter situation. Of course, not all campus safety departments have made the same decision and have instead relied on a policy that requires them to summons local police in potentially dangerous situations. Given what the research tells us about the nature and duration of these types of incidents, relying on a local police response to a campus and to buildings that they are likely unfamiliar with may not be a reasonable strategy for maintaining campus safety. Clearly, the District's peer

[15] Web citation: https://www.fandm.edu/magazine/magazine-issues/summer-2014-issue-78/summer-2014-articles/2014/08/18/trustees-decide-to-arm-campus-police-officers

[16] Web citation: http://www.courant.com/politics/capitol-watch/hc-house-community-college-officers-story.html

[17] Web citation: http://ncccommuter.org/student-senate-to-ncc-we-want-an-armed-police-force/

institutions, in both the Bay Area and the greater northern California area, have decided that this practice is unreasonable.

Figure 5: Bay Area 10 – Campus Safety Model and Arming Status

**Bay Area 10 - Campus Safety Model and Arming Status**

Figure 6: Selected Northern California Community College Districts Campus Safety Model

It is important to note that active shooter situations are not the only reason an institution may consider arming its officers. As we've noted elsewhere in this Report, target violence situations are low probability/ high impact situations. There is also the much higher probability of chance encounters with individuals who may be armed. As we learned during our visits, suspicious person/activity calls make up a significant portion of calls to Public Safety, and it is these types of calls, combined with general encounters, that are potentially dangerous to officers who are properly equipped to respond to the full range of law enforcement encounters. We also heard about visitors who come to campus for the sunset and engage in illegally smoking marijuana, and officer's reluctance to approach some of these individuals. Finally, we heard about experiences with disruptive students in the classroom and confrontations between students that are potentially dangerous situations. In all of these instances, the District's officers would need to rely on a local police response if they suspect weapon involvement. We believe this policy needlessly delays an appropriate response and may endanger other District members.

In essence, the District has created a disengagement policy that places public safety officers in an extremely difficult set of ethical and practical circumstances. By training (where training exists), instinct, and character, public safety officers want to help victims and protect people. By policy, they are supposed to stand back when they are needed most. Repealing the disengagement practice and providing trained, vetted, and oriented officers with the appropriate equipment to address the range of known and potential incidents would benefit the entire San Mateo County Community College District community.

During our sessions with SMCCCD community members, and during the first review of this report, participants and some reviewers raised valid points regarding the impact that armed officers or other target hardening efforts have had on an attacker's decision to carry out an attack. Specifically, several forum participants pointedly asked Margolis Healy facilitators if having armed officers deterred perpetrators from carrying out their attacks. The point, as we understood it, was if armed officers haven't deterred attackers, then why would the District consider arming, especially in light of the perceptions on the part of some, that armed officers dramatically alter the sense of security by some members of the campus community.

Based on our research to date, there is no publicly available information that definitely addresses the issue of whether attackers have considered the security posture at a particular location while planning their act. This is not a formal declaration that some attackers haven't considered

the relative "hardness" of a particular target. To the contrary, we are underscoring the lack of viable research to support this point.

We have learned in the aftermath of many targeted mass violence incidents (and through our on-going collaboration with threat assessment experts[18]) that perpetrators are often suicidal, with many of them taking their own lives during the course of the incident, or by engaging in "suicide by cop." This fact supports the notion that the relative hardening of a particular location may actually further encourage an attack.

We have also learned from the volumes of research (some of which is reflected in the Report) that there are concrete measures institutions should take to ensure they have a process for identifying, assessing, and managing those in the campus community who may pose a risk to themselves or others. To this point, we have made several recommendations to address the formal development of a campus threat assessment and management capacity. Finally, with respect to the implementation of measures to enhance overall safety and security in light of known or anticipated threats, we know that a rapid response to an active violent situation can significantly limit the loss of life and further injuries. Please see the below chart for a partial list of campus targeted violence incidents over the past several years, along with an indication of whether the campus safety model in place during the attack.

[18] In response to questions about the presence of armed officers at campuses that have experienced targeted violence incidents, I interviewed Dr. Gene Deisinger, Ph.D, regarding target hardening and attack selection, as well as available research regarding this topic.

Table 1 – Higher Education Targeted Violence Incidents Since 2007

Date	Location	Institution	Type of Facility	# of Fatalities	# of Wounded	Attack Resolution	Profile of Campus Safety Dept.
4/16/2007	Blacksburg, Virginia	Virginia Tech	Residence Hall, Academic Building	32 + shooter	23	Shooter suicide	Sworn, Armed
9/21/2007	Dover, Delaware	Delware State University	Campus Grounds	1	1	Suspect fled; later caught; mistrial	Sworn, Armed
							2 - Sworn, Armed 0 - Non-Sworn, Unarmed
2/8/2008	Baton Rouge, Louisiana	Louisiana Technical College	Academic Building	2 + shooter	0	Shooter suicide	Sworn, Armed
2/14/2008	DeKalb, Illinois	Northern Illinois University	Academic Building	5 + shooter	21	Shooter suicide	Sworn, Armed
10/26/2008	Conway, Arkansas	University of Central Arkansas	Campus Grounds	2	1	Suspects fled; later caught	Sworn, Armed
							3 - Sworn, Armed 0 - Non-Sworn, Unarmed
4/26/2009	Hampton, Virginia	Hampton University	Residence Hall	0	2 + shooter	Shooter attempted suicide; later apprehended	Sworn, Armed
							1 - Sworn, Armed 0 - Non-Sworn, Unarmed
2/12/2010	Huntsville, Alabama	University of Alabama in Huntsville	Academic Building	3	3	Apprehended by police	Sworn, Armed
3/9/2010	Columbus, Ohio	Ohio State University	Maintenance Building	1 + shooter	1	Shooter suicide	Sworn, Armed
9/28/2010	Austin, Texas	University of Texas	Academic Building	Shooter	0	Shooter suicide	Sworn, Armed
							3 - Sworn, Armed 0 - Non-Sworn, Unarmed
				None in 2011			
3/8/2012	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	University of Pittsburgh	Psychiatric Institute	1 + shooter	7	Attacker killed by University police	Sworn, Armed
4/2/2012	Oakland, California	Oikos University	Academic Building	7	3	Shooter fled; later apprehended	Non-Sworn, Unarmed
							1 - Sworn, Armed 1 - Non-Sworn, Unarmed
4/12/2013	Dublin, Virginia	New River Community College	Satelite Campus @ local mall	0	2	Apprehended by police	Non-Sworn, Unarmed
6/7/2013	Santa Monica, California	Santa Monica College	Residence, Campus Grounds, Library	5 + shooter	4	Shot by police	Sworn, Armed
							1 - Sworn, Armed 1 - Non-Sworn, Unarmed
1/21/2014	West Lafayette, Indiana	Purdue University	Academic Building	1	0	Apprehended by police	Sworn, Armed
6/5/2014	Seattle, Washington	Seattle Pacific University	Academic Building	2	0	Stopped by civilians; later apprehended	Non-Sworn, Unarmed
11/20/2014	Tallahassee, Florida	Florida State University	Library	Shooter	3	Attacker killed by University police	Sworn, Armed
							2 - Sworn, Armed 1 - Non-Sworn, Unarmed
10/1/2015	Roseburg, Oregon	Umpqua Community College	Academic Building	9 + shooter	9	Shooter suicide	Non-Sworn, Unarmed
							0 - Sworn, Armed 1 - Non-Sworn, Unarmed
6/1/2016	Los Angeles, California	UCLA	Academic Building	1 + shooter	0	Shooter suicide	Sworn, Armed
							1 - Sworn, Armed 0 - Non-Sworn, Unarmed
							Total 14 - Sworn, Armed 4 - Non-Sworn, Unarmed

The Current State of Police-Community Relations

During our one-on-one sessions with students, during the Campus Forums, and based on data collected via the anonymous Google Doc, we heard and sensed significant anxiety from students and some employees about the prospect of providing firearms to members of the Public Safety Department. With respect to the anonymous feedback, 48 respondents supported arming, with 67 opposing it. During the Campus Forums, participants also passionately shared their opinions about potentially arming campus officers.

Clearly, there are members of the campus community who oppose providing officers with firearms. Given the myriad of ways in which we solicited and received feedback, we can say with a high degree of certainty that there is no clear majority opinion regarding this controversial issue. Most campus members who oppose arming do so on the bases of their personal experiences with police in their communities and the perceived increase in officer-involved violence, including high profile incidents that sparked outrage and demonstrations across the United States, including in the Bay Area. Many students expressed their opinions that arming officers would decrease their sense of security on campus and lead to an unsafe environment. In our view, the perceptions about the negative impact that arming public safety officers may have on campus safety is greatly influenced by personal, familial, and community experiences with police. We believe these

perceptions may also be impacted by the lack of positive interactions with members of the Public Safety Department.

The national climate regarding relationships between law enforcement agencies and communities of color has added increasing pressure on campus safety agencies to positively engage their communities, especially traditionally underrepresented groups. At the core of this challenge are questions regarding law enforcement's ability to operate in equitable and unbiased ways. Some SMCCCD members expressed their anxiety about having a sworn and armed department, highlighting transparency, accountability, and enhanced training in several areas.

The Final Report from the White House Task Force on 21st Century Policing, created to identify ways to "strengthen community policing and trust among law enforcement officers and the communities they serve" is widely accepted as a blueprint for creating and maintaining equitable and unbiased policing. The Task Force Final Report identifies a number of "best practices" for realizing this goal, many of which are included as recommendations in this Report.

The challenge of producing unbiased policing (or campus safety) and maintaining productive relationships with the community is a particular challenge for law enforcement agencies of all types. Lori Fridell, a noted research and trainer in the areas of unbiased policing states that if a police department hires human beings, it has a challenge with bias policing and should therefore be proactive about addressing this reality. We believe that there are ample examples of campus safety agencies that have successfully addressed the challenges of bias-based policing and build mechanisms to engage in positive ways with the campus community. The first step in realizing this approach is the development of a comprehensive plan to produce biased-based policing, along with the resources to implement and monitor the plan. This plan should, as a minimum, include the following elements:

- Bias-Based Policing Policy

- Training

- Leadership/Supervision and Accountability

- Recruitment, Selection, and Promotion

- Engagement with Traditionally Underrepresented Groups

- Department Diversity and Inclusion Priorities

- Data Collection and Measurement

We further recommend that the full implementation of this plan should be a prerequisite for a possible transition to a sworn and eventual arming of the Department. In our view, a proactive strategy comprised of the above stated elements will impact how some members of the District community view and interact with their officers and perceive how arming may negatively impact campus safety.

While those who oppose arming have been no doubt vocal in their opposition, we heard from many who support a move in this direction. Individuals in favor of arming cited the apparent increase in targeted violence incidents on college campus; officers' right to protect themselves; and a sense of vulnerability at *not* having officers immediately available and equipped with the full range of tools to address potentially violent incidents.

Clearly, these differing opinions are on the complete opposite ends of a spectrum, and our experience tells us that it is highly unlikely that campus members will significantly alter their positions on this very emotional issue. We believe it is absolutely *critical* for the District to acknowledge the experiences and opinions of both groups, and, regardless of the direction it decides to follow, implement measures that speak directly to the concerns of those who oppose arming.

Having said this, in our opinion, opposition to this possible move is not the only, or even primary, factor to consider. The District's decision should be informed by its fundamental duty to provide reasonable security for its campus community, aligned with the contemporary standards in campus safety and the appropriate standard of care.

There are obviously many options the District could consider to address the gaps in response capability cited above. These options are outlined in the Campus Safety Model spectrum in this Report and include remaining a non-sworn, but armed force; contracting with a local police agency for an armed presence on campus; and others. We have, however, based on our understanding of District member's expectations and the other data cited in this Report, believe that the following two options represent the most efficient ways to enhance campus safety.

Both options call for a transition to a hybrid campus safety department with sworn and non-sworn officers comprising the campus safety staff. Option #1 recommends immediate transition with a delayed decision on arming. We believe this option is most prudent in order to establish the infrastructure to support a sworn, armed agency while also giving the District time to address concerns (primarily, but not only, from students) about how arming may impact climate and affect campus

members' sense of safety and security on campus. Option #2 also suggests an immediate transition, with a concurrent decision on arming. This option is likely to lead to vocal dissatisfaction (from anti-arming proponents) about the decision.

To be clear, regardless of the option the District and Trustees decide to follow, there is much work to be done in order to enhance safety and security at the Colleges, and we do not recommend a status quo situation.

- Option #1 – Transition to a Hybrid Campus Safety Model, with Arming Decision After Transition

  In our professional opinion, the District should have sworn department, capable of immediate response to the full range of incidents that may affect a college campus in the 21st Century. We further believe that sworn officers should have immediate access to the full range of less-than-lethal and lethal force weapons to response to violent incidents. Under this option, the District would delay a final decision on arming until such time that the Department has completed the transition to a sworn department, including appropriate and industry standard background investigations, psychological testing, and training to successfully function in a campus environment. We outline the training requirements in Attachment 3.

  Under this model, the Department becomes a sworn college police department, duly authorized under the laws of the State of California, and also retains non-sworn officers who are primarily responsible for the physical security functions of the department, such as locking/unlocking doors, providing escorts, and attending to routine calls that do not require law enforcement authority.

  Sworn peace officers, duly authorized, trained according to the standards of the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST), and empowered by the Board of Trustees, would be responsible for both security and law enforcement duties, and with the appropriate authority, training, and orientation to respond to situations requiring law enforcement action, including incidents where there are indications of violence.

  In this model, the District will employ its own peace officers that are capable of responding to the full range of routine and emergent issues that can occur on a college campus. This would include response, investigation, applying for search warrants, and enforcing California laws (including traffic) on campus. Most importantly,

this will give SMCCCD officers access to CA POST peace officer training, and will ultimately enhance the level of professionalism, knowledge, and skills of selected officers.

We estimate that this transition will take 18 to 36 months following the formal decision and will require a significant investment in the Public Safety Department, including new staff, additional resources for training, and a dedicated project manager who can oversee the implementation plan. While outside the scope of this assessment, we are prepared to provide a detailed implementation plan that outlines the resource implications.

- Option #2 – Transition to a Hybrid Campus Safety Model, with Concurrent Arming Decision

As stated above, this option is essentially the same as Option #1, but calls for an immediate decision on arming. From a political standpoint, this option is much more volatile and, in our opinion, will distract the District from the important work related to the other programmatic recommendations in this Report. Pragmatically speaking, the District should not delay implementing arming until it is satisfied that the Department has the appropriate infrastructure in place to support this important decision. As noted above, we believe there is much work to accomplish before the District can assess whether this infrastructure is in place.

Recommendations

1.1 Immediately clarify the role of the Public Safety Department, ensuring that the current staff is trained to meet the stated mission. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

1.2 Develop a communication plan to familiarize the campus community with Department role and mission, and strategy for meeting campus expectations that are outside of the Department's current capacity. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

1.3 Choose an option and develop and implement a communications strategy to inform the campus community. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

2. OPERATIONAL STRATEGY

Observations

The Public Safety Department's mission statement states, "The vision of the San Mateo County Community College District Public Safety Department includes being committed to providing quality service to

visitors, students, and staff and on our college campuses. In exercising our duties, we will be responsive to all in need regardless of their position in life; remain respectful of the diversity of our campus communities; and solicit public support and involvement in our efforts to promote organizational efficiency without detracting from the overall quality of life of our community college district."

While we applaud the Department for articulating this "vision," we suggest that there is more foundational work to accomplish to reach consensus on the Department's primary mission and role. Further, we learned that many within the Department were unable to articulate this statement and/or were unaware that Public Safety even had such a statement.

Our overall opinion is that the Department does not have a "operational strategy" per se, to address expectations (as highlighted earlier, visible officers, well trained, and engaged with the campus community). As such, we recommend the Department formally articulate a mission statement and revise this vision statement to more accurately represent its mission, vision, and values.

We were unable to identify a strategy that defines the Department's actions for achieving its long-term goals. It appears to us that efforts are haphazard, with officers basically on their own to determine their daily priorities, except in cases where there are actual assignments for specific shifts. We believe it is essential for the Department to develop, communicate, and implement a strategic plan and involve, as appropriate, all levels of the organization, as well as other internal key stakeholders. This strategic plan should serve as the foundation for all of the Department's actions, including its patrol priorities, training needs, assignments, and community engagement activities.

We are concerned about the current construct that relies on officers in the field to both serve as the responding officer and triage incoming calls for service. It is our understanding that officers have not received any training on public safety call taking or providing pre-arrival instructions during emergency calls. This is despite the widely help perception that campus members should contact Public Safety during emergency situations. We should point out that the Public Safety website offers "9-911" as the emergency number, but we found conflicting guidance on posters at all of the Colleges, and as mentioned beforehand, a general practice of calling Public Safety during emergencies. The District should continue to communicate, on the website and on social media, and during safety awareness presentations the ways in which it expects campus members to summons assistance during all types of incidents.

We are similarly concerned that the current staffing scheme provides one single officer patrolling the three Colleges during the "overnight" shift. It is perhaps true that call for service data could further support the one officer practice, but unfortunately, the Department does not have the data to support a decision in either direction. While activity on all three campuses is dramatically reduced during this time, this officer's response time to calls for service and proactive patrolling capacity is significantly reduced due to the lack of additional resources. We recommend the District consider adding at least one additional officer to the overnight shifts, and ideally, as resources permit, one dedicated officer per College. It may be possible to achieve additional coverage by creating overlapping shifts during the evening and overnight shifts. We recommend the District consider other arrangements to provide extended coverage commensurate with activity data.

One of the primary functions of any campus safety organization is to ensure the safety of the campus community during a critical incident. Based on our interviews, we've determined that there are opportunities to more clearly define the role campus safety officers will play during a critical incident and to ensure that officers are appropriately trained in these responsibilities and made aware of the location of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) that would house campus leadership during a critical incident.

Recommendations

2.1 Revise the current "vision" statement to align with the District's vision and develop a mission statement accompanied by core values. (UoR: M; CoR: M; RI: N)

2.2 Develop an operational strategy with appropriate benchmarks to guide DPS operations. Ideally, the strategy would include the following elements: (UoR: M; CoR: M; RI: R)

    a. Formal articulation of mission and values; role and authority and jurisdiction;

    b. Patrol operations and priorities;

    c. Investigative operations;

    d. Call-taking, dispatch, and central monitoring operations;

    e. Crime prevention, community policing, and campus community engagement initiatives;

    f. Addressing the Use & Misuse of Alcohol and Other Drugs;

    g. Campus Threat Assessment and Management;

    h.   Emergency management structure and goals;

    i.   Special event management;

    j.   Community Caretaking functions;

    k.   Physical security and security technology implementation plan; and,

    l.   Regulatory Compliance

2.3 Once this operational plan is developed, ensure all members of the organization are aware of this plan and know their individual roles and responsibilities in achieving the organizations goals and objectives. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

2.4 Form a campus safety working group comprised of internal key stakeholders to assist in developing and maintaining the organization's operational strategy. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

3. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Observations

While the Department is relatively small when compared to departments at larger institutions, the executive and management responsibilities are, nonetheless, quite diverse, complex, and time consuming. For example, in the past year or so, the higher education campus safety community has come to acknowledge and understand the need for comprehensive strategies to substantively engage with traditionally disenfranchised campus community members, the wider campus community, and local communities. Developing these strategies takes time, effort, collaboration, and a level of sophistication not envisioned a short time ago. They likewise require a team effort, and the current Director does not have a management team capable of providing adequate support for the myriad of responsibilities he faces on a routine basis.

The Director needs a command staff capable of supporting the agency's administrative and operational needs. In our experience, a campus safety department serving a District like SMCCCD, with three very distinct College needs a clear second-in-command, or deputy director, and at least two command staff positions – one managing operations and one managing support/administrative functions. This command structure, staffed with the appropriate individuals who understand the nuances of campus safety and security, can free up the Director to focus on strategic initiatives, participate in District-wide and College specific committees, and interface with colleagues across the campuses.

We believe the district should re-structure the Department, creating a deputy director position and two managers leading the two primary functional areas: Operations and Administration/Support. To further support the investigative needs of the Department, the District should also consider the creation of an investigator's position housed in the main District Public Safety Department.

Chart 3 – Campus Safety Department Organizational Chart

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Investigations

Internal Affairs/Professional Standards

OPERATIONS	**SUPPORT/ADMINISTRATION**
Patrol	Personnel
Communications Center	Training
Parking Management	Crime Prevention, Community Policing, Community Engagement
	Planning & Analysis
	Records
	Property
	Facilities/Equipment/Vehicles/Supply

We are further perplexed by the designation of three separate "chiefs." In our experience, we have never come across a situation where there are three chiefs in on department. We believe the District should reconsider the current designations and move to a more efficient structure with one chief (also designated as an "Executive Director" given the breath of his responsibilities) leading the Public Safety Department, with commanders or captains overseeing campus safety operations at the three Colleges.

Recommendations

3.1 Create a Department command staff, including the creation of deputy director, two assistant director level positions and fill the positions with candidates who have higher education experience. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: S)

3.2 Consider re-designating the current director as "Executive Director" and chief, and reclassify the College chiefs to deputy chief, commander, captain, or other suitable title. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: S)

3.3 Consider creating an investigator position, staffed with a highly trained and experienced investigator. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: S)

4. WRITTEN DIRECTIVES AND ACCREDITATION

Observations

Public Safety is currently utilizing a proprietary policy manual product "Lexipol" for developing its written directives. Lexipol, established in 2003, is a nationally recognized company that provides risk management policies to campus safety and law enforcement agencies across the country. While Margolis Healy is vendor agnostic, we support the use of this program, as long as the Department is accurately tailoring the policies for its environment and operations.

It is essential for a campus safety department to have a formal written directive system to provide direction, structure and organization to department members. Westfall and Gallagher, well regarded police liability consultants, identified twelve critical tasks that are responsible for 90 percent of the litigation against police or public safety agencies that warrant formal direction from an agency:

1. Off-duty conduct

2. Use of force

3. Pursuit/emergency vehicle operator course (EVOC)

4. Search/seizure/arrest

5. Care, custody, control/restraint of prisoners

6. Domestic violence

7. Property/evidence

8. Sexual harassment/discrimination

9. Selection/hiring

10. Internal affairs

11. Special operations

12. Dealing with the mentally ill

We were not made aware nor were we provided with any information that Public Safety had established a policy review committee made up of internal and external partners designed to develop, review and enhance the agency's policy manual. Public Safety should continue to develop all of the critical and non-critical policies, focusing at first on those that we have identified above. Additionally, the Department

should establish a policy review committee and the committee's first task should be to review and update all existing policies and to ensure these policies cover all key critical tasks mentioned above.

Ultimately, it should be a District goal to seek law enforcement accreditation through the Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) or IACLEA, the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Agencies. We believe that the recommendations in this Report, if accepted and implemented, will start the Department well on its way to achieving accreditation.

Recommendations

4.1 Ensure all Public Safety personnel review and demonstrate proficiency with all department policies and procedures. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

4.2 Develop an annual in-service training program designed to train/test/evaluate all personnel on relevant department policies and procedures. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

4.3 Develop a policy review committee made up of internal and external stakeholders designed to develop, review and enhance the agency's policy manual. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

4.4 Review the Westfall and Gallagher's key critical tasks mentioned above and develop/enhance existing policies to cover these areas. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

4.5 Consider seeking law enforcement accreditation at the opportune time. (UoR: L; CoR: H; RI: S)

5. CRIME PREVENTION, SAFETY AWARENESS, AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Observations

Similar to the feedback we received regarding the campus community's desire for immediate action training, campus members consistently expressed their expectations that public safety officers should be more engaged, in a positive manner and in several different ways, with students, faculty, and staff. We heard this sentiment echoed at all of the Colleges, with several individual expressing a willingness and strong desire to partner with public safety in future safety and security programming.

SMCCCD's Public Safety Patrol Policy #400 directs public safety officers to engage in community oriented policing and problem solving to reduce crime on each of their campuses. During our conversations

with officers and campus members, we heard that the Department has not actually created opportunities for officers to engage in any meaningful ways. We identified few instances where the Department has engaged in crime prevention programming, facilitated safety and security conversations with their Colleges or conducted outreach with student, faculty or staff groups.

One of the pillars of an effective community policing strategy is visible presence of officers engaged in their public safety role and doing so in partnership with the community. In our discussions with many campus stakeholders, they expressed rarely seeing officers patrolling the campus, and when they do see them, the officers are engaged in the parking enforcement role, which is, by its very nature, a negative role. Many campus members stated that there are limited opportunities to get to know individual officers and that there is a significant void in understanding what the department does besides writing tickets. This void speaks to the need to brand the department and ensure the campus understands its fundamental role, after District leadership has reached consensus on this issue.

Given the negative experiences that some SMCCCD students have with law enforcement in their local communities, it is imperative that Public Safety develop and implement a proactive strategy to form partnerships with campus community members with the goal of shifting the paradigm away from negative police-community interactions to a trust based relationship that nurtures legitimacy.

Recommendations

5.1 Consider adding a District level position focusing primarily on community policing, crime prevention, and campus community engagement. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

5.2 Conduct community policing training at all levels of the department. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

5.3 Develop a community policing and community engagement strategy. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

5.4 Train officers in crime prevention techniques and strategies; develop crime prevention tools and presentations; and create crime prevention and educational social media campaigns. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

6. TRAINING AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT

Observations

During our review, we determined that there is limited formal training for newly hired officers and minimal ongoing formal training for all officers. The Department should have a formal field or training program designed to orient and evaluate newly hired officers and to inculcate and integrate them into the specific operational structures of the department, the Colleges, or the District.

While we understand that campus safety personnel receive a basic level of training at the beginning of their employment, the organization lacks comprehensive field training and in-service training programs designed to ensure all employees can meet the safety and security expectations of each campus community.

Additionally, the Department does not have a trained or certified field-training officer to manage such a program. According to the International Association of Chief's of Police Best Practices Guide for Field Training for Today's Recruits, "Law enforcement agencies want recruits to be well trained and enthusiastic about becoming police officers. When recruits experience training as a professional and supportive environment that focuses on safety and learning, the outcome of that training imparts both a successful transition for recruits into their new work assignments and underscores the importance and necessity of the substantial financial investment in the recruit by the local agency."[19]

The Department has no one permanently assigned to manage and led the training enterprise, including maintaining training records. We believe the District should consider designating a training officer. We believe this position should be centralized at the District level, and may be a responsibility assigned to an associate director (see earlier recommendations regarding organizational structure).

We heard from Public Safety leadership that they are exploring ways to broaden the internal training expertise and identify potential instructors for some of the critical law enforcement areas such as use of force instruction, community policing, response to intimate partner violence, criminal investigations and other related topics. We recommend the Department aggressively pursue this initiative and include in the list of topics fair and impartial policing, compassionate communication, crisis intervention, trauma-informed investigations, and problem solving.

[19]International Association of Chief's Best Practice Guide for Field Training for Today's Recruits, http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/documents/pdfs/BP-FieldTrainingforTodaysRecruits.pdf

During our conversations with campus safety leadership and officers, we also learned there is an opportunity to develop a training program with local emergency first response organizations to ensure an effective response to a critical incident. Ensuring that campus safety and responding agencies are familiar with their specific response roles and responsibilities, having a clear picture of how agencies will communicate with each other and the pre-planning of emergency response routes, staging areas and the sharing of building floor plans can ensure the timely and effective response to an on-campus emergency.

Recommendations

6.1 Reach consensus on recruit level training requirement. Given other recommendations in this Report, we highly recommend that officers be required to have already obtained basic police officer recruit training or be able to obtain it within 18 months of initial employment. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

6.2 Develop a new employee training and orientation program. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

6.3 Develop a field training program managed by individuals who have received POST certifications in field training. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

6.4 Develop a training matrix/schedule that identifies training that should be completed based on seniority, officer interest and time on the department. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

6.5 Encourage and incentivize officers to attend appropriate training and obtain instructor certifications in the areas of crime prevention, community policing, criminal investigations, dispatch operations, use of force, conflict de-escalation, fair and impartial policing, trauma-informed investigations, and other related training topics. (UoR: L; CoR: H; RI: R)

6.6 Develop a comprehensive annual training program designed to ensure all employees can meet/exceed the safety and security expectations of the campus community. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

6.7 Develop a training and exercise program with external first response organizations to train, test and evaluate the campuses ability to respond to a variety of critical incidents. (UoR: I; CoR: M; RI: R)

7. PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM

General Observations

To understand the physical security program and organizational decision-making process for the implementation of the program, our team visited each of the three SMCCCD Colleges during both day and evening hours and met with several key stakeholders to identify specific challenges, concerns or opportunities to strengthen the program.

In general, we found the three Colleges address physical security in a similar manner with regards to electronic access control, security cameras, way-finding signage, parking and lighting. We believe this is the result of the District taking a proactive approach to understanding the needs of each College. Therefore, the majority of our observations in this section apply to the entire District, although we did identify some particular areas of concern at the individual Colleges.

SMCCCD currently utilizes a wide range of electronic security systems ranging from digital security cameras and electronic access control to intrusion detection, duress and held/forced open door alarms. We believe the District has increasingly placed a priority on the use of these systems in an effort to enhance campus security and to meet contemporary standards in higher education security.

We were also encouraged to see the number of mechanical or "non-technical" systems and devices the District has implemented. For example, the District has an emergency alert system (EAS) and has installed interior classroom locks. While these types of countermeasures may not be readily visible to the public eye, when combined with other measures such as security cameras and alarms, staff and policy, they create a more comprehensive program that provides security "in depth," supporting a resilient environment.

While we were encouraged by these efforts, many of the initiatives have been implemented in a disconnected manner without the benefit of an overall security strategic plan. For instance, several administrators stated that security upgrades were often implemented with little input from College leadership and that, in many instances, the upgrades were reactionary to a specific incident rather than a proactive strategic decision further supporting our opinion that the District needs an overall security strategic plan. We believe this is an area the District can quickly address through the development of a security strategic plan developed through the shared governance structure.

Another example of how a strategic security plan would benefit the District is with the use of propped or "held open" door alarms. While the electronic access control system has the capability to monitor these alarms in real time, these alarms are often disabled or ignored. Of course, while a considerable number of these alarms may be nuisance alarms activated by routine operations, deliveries, etc., the District does not have a policy to address these alarms during daytime and non-business hours. Essentially, the District is routinely ignoring alarms that could be indications of unauthorized attempted access. Ignoring these alarms and/or deactivating an important component of the access control system potentially create liability exposure.

Our greatest area of focus surrounds the need to implement a comprehensive physical security program and creating the subject matter expertise at the District level. We firmly believe that the physical security program should be centralized at the District, while simultaneously having a strong focus on the specific needs of the Colleges. In order to implement such a strategy, we believe the District should consider creating a position to develop and manage this strategy. This position need not be dedicated fulltime to the physical security program, but the individual must have considerable experience in physical security design and implementation. This position would manage the development of facility security standards, oversee security aspects of new construction and renovations, and oversee the selection of equipment and policy development.

Creating this position may not require additional headcount to the District, as it may be possible to reclassify an existing position and simply move departments. For example, we believe the District already employs at least one individual within the Facilities group with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to assume this position. If the District agrees that individual is capable and can be moved from one department to another, this is a fairly simple reorganization. We note that there can be great benefits to promoting from within the organization, including institutional knowledge transfer, cultural competency, minimal additional training requirements and reduced selection costs.

We believe this position should be responsible for coordinating district-wide physical security programs, developing equipment and facility standards, policies, coordinating project meetings and vendor management therefore addressing the majority of gaps identified during our assessment and centralizing the efforts.

Further, we believe the District should designate Public Safety as the primary "business owner" or responsible department for the design, implementation, management and policy development of physical security and associated systems. This includes physical security programs, including security technology, on all SMCCCD campuses. The current decentralized model that splits various responsibilities amongst Information Technology, Facilities and Public Safety leads to inconsistent applications and can lead to disparate systems that do not effectively communicate.

These efforts, however, are not panaceas for every physical security challenge, including the gaps we identified. Because security technology is changing faster than systems can be installed and implemented, we believe it is imperative that the District forms a physical security working group. This formal multi-constituent group of key stakeholders should include District and the College representatives that have functional and strategic responsibility for safety and security. The group's primary objective would be to assist in the development of security technology standards and policies; review and approve security technology measures; ensure collaboration and inclusion of security technology standards during major renovations; and serve in a strategic planning function.

Specific Observations

<u>*Lighting*</u>

As part of our physical security assessment, we walked each campus at night to better understand the campuses present during hours of darkness and reduced visibility. Lighting, or the lack thereof, can have a significant psychological impact towards an individual's perception of safety and security.

In general, we found the lighting scheme and amount of available lighting surrounding academic, administrative and recreational buildings as well as parking lots, facility entrances and sidewalks to meet or in many cases, exceed, reasonable standards. We evaluate campus lighting against security standards established by the Illuminating Engineers Society of North America. We understand the District recently engaged in a substantial LED lighting upgrade project that has been well received by the community and from what we were told during interviews, has allayed many of the concerns regarding lighting and traversing the campuses during the evening.

As with any lighting scheme, we observed an occasional light out, dark pockets or areas that may appear dark to the eye, but overall, lighting met acceptable standards. In the case of dark pockets, we do

not recommend adding additional lighting or making upgrades unless information exists to suggest a particular circumstance or situation requires this action. For example, if students or faculty frequently walk or park in a particular area that meets standards, but appears dark, making an upgrade would be reasonable. However, we did not observe this situation at any of the Colleges and applaud the District for implementing a well-conceived lighting scheme that is both aesthetically pleasing and contributes to the overall sense of security.

Security Devices

The District should focus on the consistent and standardized application of security devices on the Colleges. While we discussed and were provided with some draft standards and plans, we believe this is an opportunity for the District to evaluate any current standards for equipment, facilities and access and to formalize the process. This should be an inclusive process and a focal point of the above-mentioned working group. This would include not only the type of security equipment and hardware, some of which IT and Facilities have already informally established, but also facility access standards, personal access profiles, and facility design standards.

These standards typically create consistent practices across the district and its multiple campuses, but will also help to prevent disparate levels of security in similar facilities. Standardization also helps to ensure facilities that go through substantial renovations are brought up to standard and appropriately budgeted for. Below is a high-level sample of a potential facility standards matrix and an access control matrix for reference.

Emergency Alert System

We heard consistent complaints from Building Captains, administrators, faculty and staff regarding the EAS and the audibility of the system. In many cases, individuals expressed that they could hear an alert being triggered, however they were unable to understand the message due to acoustics (reverberation) and/or distortion. We did not witness a test of the system, but given the consistent complaints, we are convinced that the District must attend to this challenge. The District should immediately conduct a test of the system with the vendor to identify problem spots and attendant adjustments to resolve these issues.

General Recommendations for the District (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)

7.1   Consider formally placing the responsibility for physical security, security systems and management under the District Department of Public Safety. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.2   Create a position responsible for district-wide security systems management. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)

7.3   Create a physical security working group that brings together key stakeholders throughout the district.(UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.4   Establish district-wide facility security standards. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.5   Develop district-wide security equipment minimum standards for each technology such as cameras, electronic access, recorders, etc. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.6   Develop a door alarm monitoring and response policy and implement it for all District facilities. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.7   Develop an annual operational budget for physical security, including security technology systems. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)

7.8   Test of the EAS with selected vendor to make adjustments to problem areas. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

College Specific Observations

College of San Mateo

Observations

We noted two particular areas of concern that we believe should be addressed at the District.

First, we observed that while each building has a number on the outside of the building and in most cases, in more than one location, the numbering is not always in logical order or grouping and the numbers are not always consistent in size or placement. While numbering the buildings is a wise step that can assist local first responders coming to campus, we believe it is important to consider renumbering the buildings based on current and future construction as well as standardizing the size and location of building numbers.

Second, we note that Building 10, 4th Floor, houses College senior leadership. While we appreciate the open access and transparency, we believe that the District should consider enhancements to the physical security environment including considering the installation

of electronic access control with remote lockdown capabilities by office staff which could save time in reporting a dynamic incident such as a violent intruder.

In addition, frontline staff would benefit from de-escalation training that would better prepare them in the event they encounter a difficult subject entering the work area. This training, in combination with emergency drills designed to test existing plans, and the use of security systems, should elevate the security of the suite.

Additional Recommendations for the College of San Mateo

7.9 Consider renumbering all campus buildings to a logical grouping based on current and future construction. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.10 Standardize the size and location of building numbers. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.11 Conduct training for staff in 4th floor executive suite in the use of duress alarms and regular testing of the alarms. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

7.12 Consider conducting de-escalation training for executive suite staff. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

Skyline College

At Skyline College, we identified several local issues that we believe the District should address. These range from way-finding signage to security camera placement and phones.

First, the Pacific Heights Building was mentioned as a security concern during nearly all of our interviews. We visited the building that is partially used for classes, but also doubles as a storage location. We observed a number of opportunities to enhance security at the building. While we understand the long-term plan is to completely renovate the facility, we believe higher priority concerns such as access control, propped doors and internal way-finding signage can be addressed reasonably with minimal investments that can be recycled in the future.

We also observed the courtyard created by Building 1, Building 2 and the Theater is a heavily traversed area. We believe this would be a reasonable area to add security cameras. This would include a combination a 3 to 4 fixed cameras and ideally, a pole mounted 360° camera to provide deterrent and identification level images.

We also observed a door leading into the theater is chain locked from the inside, prohibiting egress. We believe this is a concern for the College that should be evaluated. First, it may in fact violate fire

code and second, it is not marked or labeled in any way so essentially, an individual would attempt to pass-through the door unaware it is locked from the inside.

We also observed at that Building 5, the loading dock is a busy area with nearby access to classrooms and the mailroom. The District should consider adding a camera to the loading dock to monitor activity. In addition, we observed classroom doors (with direct access to outside the building) were propped open. Our recommendation is that classrooms should not be propped open while classes are in session and preferably, never at all.

Additional Recommendations for Skyline College

7.13 Consider creating a single point of entry to the Pacific heights Building and add electronic access control. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

7.14 Add a camera to the main entrance to the Pacific Heights Building. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

7.15 Increase internal way-finding signage in Pacific Heights Building to provide better direction and emergency egress. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.16 Consider adding fixed cameras to the exterior of Buildings 1, 2 & the Theater to cover the courtyard. Additionally, consider adding a 360° pole camera to the center of the courtyard. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

7.17 Review the chained theater door for fire code compliance and egress. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.18 Consider adding a camera to the loading dock of Building 5. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

7.19 Prohibit propping of classroom doors and emphasize this during security orientations and with appropriately placed signage. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

Cañada College

At Cañada College, we again observed several of the major themes discussed earlier in the report such as a lack of equipment and facility security standardization and decentralization further contributing to the sense that the District implements security practices with little input or consideration from the College.

However, we did make several observations specific to Cañada that we believe the District should address.

First, there are a variety of locking mechanisms for doors ranging from traditional hard keys, to electronic access control with the use of FOBs and some access cards. We were unable to ascertain exactly why this has occurred, but believe the College should work to standardize locking mechanisms consistent with District policy.

We also observed and were told that doors with windows could not be covered. It has been an emerging best practice for classrooms and offices to have the ability to cover windows (where reasonable) during an emergency situation. This can be accomplished in a number of ways from inexpensive mini-blinds and shades to having a paper cover near the door that uses hooks or Velcro.

We also observed several gray phones on the exterior of buildings that can be used to dial various extensions on campus. During our tours, we found some of these phones did not work well (the individual on the other end could not hear us) and they are not appropriately labeled. In our opinion, they appeared to be intended for emergencies similar to how many campuses use blue light emergency phones. Given this apparent intended use, the College should conduct a test of all phones to ensure they are functioning properly, paint them to a consistent, high visibility color, install appropriate signage, and develop a routine testing schedule.

Additional Recommendations for Canada College

7.20 Standardize locations that receive hard keys and use electronic access control. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.21 Determine what type of credential will be used to gain access where electronic readers are used. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.22 Consider adding shades, blinds or other item to cover classroom and office doors that have windows. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

7.23 Conduct a test of all gray phones to ensure functionality. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.24 Consider branding all phones using a highly visible color and signage. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.25 Develop a consistent testing schedule and document needed repairs. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

8. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN AND TRAINING FOR CRITICAL INCIDENTS

Observations

SMCCD has been engaged with an external emergency management consultant to assist in the development of an all-hazards Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) and to design and conduct relevant training programs in the form of exercises and drills at the Colleges.

We met with the District's consultant, the Director of Public Safety and the Building Captains at each College to gain a better understanding of the efforts to date and opportunities for future improvements.

First, each College has a robust EOP that, in our opinion, meets reasonable contemporary standards in higher education (as compared to the *Guide for Developing High Quality Emergency Operations Plans*). The plans are well written and include the appropriate basic plan and functional and hazard specific annexes.

The district has adopted "The Big Five" as a guide for immediate Action Response. Essentially these actions are used as part of an all-hazards response to a wide range of emergencies. The five actions include:

- Shelter In Place

- Drop, Cover And Hold On

- Secure Campus

- Lockdown/Barricade

- Evacuation

These immediate actions are also consistent with contemporary standards for immediate response actions often seen in higher education. We believe this is a critical area for the District to place its focus. While robust emergency plans are necessary and can often guide an institution through a protracted event, we know the immediate actions taken by the faculty, staff and students at the onset of an emergency can save lives.

While we are impressed with the actions to date, we believe there are a number ways to build upon the work currently underway.

First, while we acknowledge the exceptional work of the District's external consultant, we believe the District should consider creating the position of Director of Emergency Management reporting to the Director of Public Safety (see earlier recommendations regarding the organizational structure). We believe this position will strengthen the

overall emergency management program and create an opportunity to build relationships to better prepare for and manage local or regional emergencies and provide continuity of operations. That said, understanding the amount of time and effort required to coordinate complex training scenarios across multiple campuses and the added value of subjective, third-party exercise evaluation, we believe there will be an on-going role for a consultant in designing, facilitating and evaluating drills and exercises.

Second, while we have complimented the EOPs, we also believe that as we mentioned, lengthy plans are more appropriate for leadership and managing protracted multi-operational period emergencies. These plans are of little value to the average community member who simply needs to know what to do during an emergency. In fact, nearly everyone with whom we met expressed a desire for consistent immediate response training.

We believe SMCCD should foster an aggressive campaign to promote "The Big Five" including renewed information on the Public Safety website and the College's social media platforms. This campaign should be branded to each College and include classroom posters, table tents, and other low costs branding messages. It should also include more drills, and particularly focusing on the drop, cover and hold, lockdown/ barricade and evacuation.

SMCCD has also identified a number Building Captains on each campus who serve as an extension of the Public Safety and aid in force multiplication during emergency events. We support this initiative and view it as a proactive step for the District to take and for each College to adopt.

We identified several ways to further improve the program. Almost unanimously, the different campus Building Captains identified several common themes. First, many stated that they do not have a full understanding of their roles and responsibilities during an emergency. While they receive an email reminding them what to do during an earthquake or lockdown, they do not feel sufficiently prepare to act.

Second, many identified a desire for additional training opportunities in the form of real-time drills. We consistently heard that they need additional drills and after action or lessons learned sessions to become proficient in their duties.

Third, we also heard and agree there is a need to identify additional back-ups to the designated Building Captains. In addition, the District emergency manager should identify unique and special circumstances

such as the Food Pantry at Skyline College that is routinely visited by unaffiliated community members, including families who are unfamiliar with campus protocols and may require additional assistance.

Finally, we heard that Building Captains often had to confront individuals who either refused or did not want to participate in drills, including situations where individuals refuse to evacuate a building or lockdown. We also heard that this most often occurs with faculty members. While we understand that drills and exercises can be disruptive to the academic process, it is important to have full participation from all campus members. We believe SMCCCD will need to address this before future drills possibly by adding language to drill announcements or working with department chairs to increase awareness and participation.

We were also advised that drills are typically only held during classes. While we understand why this is convenient and allows for a more manageable drill, we also know that emergencies can and do happen at the most unpredictable times. In our opinion, the District should consider conducting drills at various times, especially in between classes when large groups of individuals are traversing the campus.

Recommendations

8.1 Consider creating the position of Emergency Manager at the District. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)

8.2 Develop an Immediate Action Response campaign to raise awareness to immediate actions "The Big Five." (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

8.3 Conduct Immediate Action Response training on all campuses. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

8.4 Develop and distribute updated position responsibility list for all Building Captains. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

8.5 Provide additional training for building captains designed to test their specific roles and responsibilities. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

8.6 Identify and train additional Building Captains to a 3-deep list, ensuring at least 3 Building Captains for every position. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

8.7 Mandate all faculty, staff and students to participate in scheduled drills through announcements and department meetings. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

8.8 Conduct campus drills during and in between classes when the campus is active. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

SECTION IV – SECONDARY FOCUS AREAS

9. DISPATCH OPERATIONS/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

Observations

The District relies on a mobile phone carried by the public safety officers as the call taking and dispatch process. The current process is problematic in several ways, including lack of call taking and dispatch training for the officers, the absence of industry standard checklists and guidelines for triaging calls, and the overreliance on a mobile phone for receiving emergency calls. Additionally, because there is no central dispatch operation, the District and the Colleges are unable to consistently records calls for service, monitor security cameras, and coordinate emergency responders.

Needless to say, we heard several complaints and negative comments about the current system, including missed calls and rude interactions. We believe that the current system is outdated and that District security operations have evolved to the point of requiring a professional dispatch operation. In our professional opinion, the District should develop a central Communications Center staff during the hours public safety officers are working. Currently this would require, at a minimum, approximately 3.5 – 4 FTE, appropriate equipment, and operational policies and procedures.

We recognize that this would be a significant undertaking and financial commitment but believe it is absolutely essential for a 21st Century campus safety operation.

The District may also want to consider contracting out this function if it can be done in way that does not negatively impact the District's autonomy over its campus safety operations.

Recommendation

9.1   Establish a central Communications Center operation to manage calls for service, alarm and access control monitoring, security camera monitoring, and walk-in inquiries. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)

10. COLLABORATION WITH KEY INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS

Observations

Overall, we found that there are opportunities for Public Safety to interact with students, faculty and staff, especially in the area of training opportunities, participation in meetings and committees with key stakeholders. Administrators expressed the need for more involvement with their departments/offices and their willingness to explore opportunities and initiatives to involve officers and engage them with students, student programs, faculty and staff.

We found that most administrators knew the name of the chiefs of their respective campuses and had positive relationships with them, however few stakeholders knew line officers' names. Identifying opportunities for all of public safety staff to engage more with the key internal stakeholders will further enhance an understanding of public safety operations, protocols, and policies as well as other department operations, protocols and policies. Exploring collaborations and establishing joint training and formal check-ins with managers from partner departments will help in building relationships during non-critical times and enhances understanding of the roles and missions, which further strengthens critical partnerships.

There is little knowledge within Public Safety regarding the critical issue of Title IX-covered complaints. Additional collaboration between the Title IX coordinators and investigations is critical to ensure that complaints are handled appropriately. Additional training on the Title IX process and trauma-informed intake and investigations could help to bridge some gaps between public safety and Title IX coordinators.

We found that there is a strong working relationship with Auxiliary Services and Public Safety at all three Colleges. We received positive feedback regarding the student ambassador program but some reflected that more involvement with public safety would help the ambassadors promote what public safety can do for the students.

As previously mentioned, Public Safety has little involvement with student groups and activities, especially in the area with Student Life and Leadership. There are opportunities to enhance crime prevention and safety awareness programming through other college administrators, departments and offices. This type of engagement would typically occur through initial introductions and purposeful efforts to identify opportunities to partner on programming around a specific topic (identity theft, or doing Sexual Assault Prevention Month)

There is no campus safety advisory committee at the District level or at the Colleges. The committee should be comprised of key stakeholders, as well as students, faculty and staff. A public safety advisory committee serves the campus communities by providing opportunities to discuss and address campus safety issues; learn about initiatives within public safety; provide feedback from the campus community related to public safety; and can educate key stakeholders on public safety processes and procedures.

Recommendations

10.1   Develop and implement an initiative for enhancing relationships with partner departments. This would typically involve identifying key partner departments and assigning a liaison to that department. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

10.2   Identify representatives or liaisons within public safety to serve on appropriate campus committees with key stakeholders. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

10.3   Establish a Campus Safety Advisory Committee to include key stakeholders as members. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

11. COORDINATION WITH EXTERNAL PARTNERS

Observations

Overall, we were impressed with the relationship between Public Safety and the supporting police departments. Director Woods has made a concerted effort to reach out to all the law enforcement partners. He should continue these efforts by formally scheduling ways to regularly meet together with all of the supporting chiefs. Eventually, he should consider expanding this initiative by meeting with other leaders from the first responder community. This initiative is extremely important given the very nature of the 3 geographically separated Colleges with multiple external law enforcement jurisdictions.

Although there are MOUs in place with all the law enforcement partners, we identified gaps that the District should consider. The MOU that SMCCD has with the SMCOES deals with the use of SMCCCD properties to provide emergency shelter for displaced community members, emergency medical treatment/inoculations sites, access to KCSM Radio and logistic staging areas for emergency response and recovery efforts. There is no MOU with the San Mateo Sheriff's Office addressing their response to and cooperation with the 3 Colleges. Although there are MOUs with SMPD and SBPD, there should also be

one that clarifies the roles and expectations for the SMSD should they respond to any of the Colleges.

We heard a constant theme from all College chiefs that communication with their respective law enforcement partners could be improved especially communication interoperability. Time is of the essence during critical incidents and a method for quick and reliable communication between the departments and their law enforcement partners should be a priority.

Recommendations

11.1   Schedule quarterly meetings with all the law enforcement partners and have the Director and all 3 SMCCCD Chiefs attend. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

11.2   Develop a MOU between the SMCCD DPS and the San Mateo Sheriff's Office that delineates roles and responsibilities. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

11.3   Explore ways to create interoperable communications with the local police agencies. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: S)

12. RECRUITMENT/SELECTION/RETENTION

Observations

The human resource function is centralized at the District. The hiring process is outlined in the District policy. Human Resources completes the advertisement for the positions. Job descriptions have been revised. There is a screening meeting to review applications. A panel decides whom they will interview. The panel usually includes at least a chief, an administrator and an officer, but does not include any students. There is nothing in District or College policies that would prohibit the involvement of students or others. The union can say if they don't want a particular person on the panel.

The director received the approval to hire two additional officers. Prior job descriptions required prior attendance to a POST certified academy, but it did not require POST certification. Public Safety would like to change that requirement to be POST certified, which we would highly recommend. This would also require a psychological exam and complete background investigation, which is not currently being done. Psychological exams and thorough background investigations are critical and best practices in today's public safety environment.

Given that Public Safety does not have a formal "recruitment program," we believe they should consider such a program to enhance their selection processes and further diversify the department. With the POST academy on the College of San Mateo campus, there is a great opportunity to reach qualified, and trained applicants.

Although there is a low turnover rate, unlike other smaller campus safety agencies, Public Safety struggles with their best and brightest leaving for larger, more challenging, or more "prestigious" law enforcement employers.

With their small staff, there are rare promotional opportunities within the department. There appears to be limited supervision within the department, especially on the evening shifts, with just one lieutenant who covers all three campuses.

Recommendations

12.1   Develop a formal recruitment program. (UoR: L; CoR: H; RI: R)

12.2   Include other key stakeholders, including students, in the selection process. (UoR: L; CoR: H; RI: R)

12.3   Appropriately 12 months following the full implementation of a computer-aided dispatch system and the collection of call for service data, conduct a staffing study to identify adequate staffing and supervision. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

13. COMPENSATION

Observations

According to those we interviewed, the pay, pension plan and benefits are comparable with the other community colleges in the area. None of the public safety staff expressed concern about their salary and benefits, which is highly unusual. Most concerns were focused on training and equipment. Human Resources completes salary surveys per District policy.

Other opportunities for additional compensation may include stipends for officers who volunteer to take on additional duties such as field training officer, instructor, special skills or other specialized tasks.

Recommendation

13.1   Consider additional "special duty" stipends for officers who volunteer for additional duties such as field training officer, instructor, special skills or other specialized tasks. (UoR: L; CoR: M; RI: R)

SECTION V – MASTER RECOMMENDATION LIST & MATRIX

MASTER LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Urgency of Recommendation **(UoR): Immediate (I)** means the College should initiate the action now; **Mid-Term (M)** means the College should take the action within the next 60 – 120 days; **Long-Term (L)** means the College should consider fully implementing the action post-120 days, but no later than one year following final acceptance of the Report.

Confidence of Recommendation **(CoR): High (H)** means that the recommendation is *highly likely* to close the gap between the contemporary standard and the current practice. **Medium (M)** means that the action will *likely* close the gap, and **Low (L)** means the recommendation *may* address the gap, dependent on other factors.

Resource Implications and Budget Impact **(RI):** This refers to the resources needed to fully implement the recommendation. **Substantial (S)** implies a significant investment; **Routine (R)** means the cost is a routine cost of maintaining a highly professional and competent campus safety department; and **Negligible (N)** means the recommendation should have minimal budgetary impact.

Role and Mission

1.1 Immediately clarify the role of the Public Safety Department, ensuring that the current staff is trained to meet the stated mission. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

1.2 Develop a communication plan to familiarize the campus community with Department role and mission, and strategy for meeting campus expectations that are outside of the Department's current capacity. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

1.3 Choose an option and develop and implement a communications strategy to inform the campus community. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

Operational Strategy

2.1 Revise the current "vision" statement to align with the District's vision and develop a mission statement accompanied by core values. (UoR: M; CoR: M; RI: N)

2.2 Develop an operational strategy with appropriate benchmarks to guide DPS operations. As a minimum, the strategy should include the following elements: (UoR: M; CoR: M; RI: R)

a. Formal articulation of mission and values; role and authority and jurisdiction;

b. Patrol operations and priorities;

c. Investigative operations;

d. Call-taking, dispatch, and central monitoring operations;

e. Crime prevention, community policing, and campus community engagement initiatives;

f. Addressing the Use & Misuse of Alcohol and Other Drugs;

g. Campus Threat Assessment and Management;

h. Emergency management structure and goals;

i. Special event management;

j. Community Caretaking functions;

k. Physical security and security technology implementation plan; and,

l. Regulatory Compliance

2.3 Once this operational plan is developed, ensure all members of the organization are aware of this plan and know their individual roles and responsibilities in achieving the organizations goals and objectives. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

2.4 Form a campus safety working group comprised of internal key stakeholders to assist in developing and maintaining the organization's operational strategy. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

Organizational Structure

3.1 Create a Department command staff, including the creation of deputy director, two assistant director level positions and fill the positions with candidates who have higher education experience. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: S)

3.2 Consider re-designating the current director as "Executive Director" and chief, and reclassify the College chiefs to commander, captain, or other suitable title. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: S)

3.3 Consider creating an investigator position, staffed with a highly trained and experienced investigator. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: S)

Written Directives and Accreditation

4.1 Ensure all Public Safety personnel review and demonstrate proficiency with all department policies and procedures. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

4.2 Develop an annual in-service training program designed to train/test/evaluate all personnel on relevant department policies and procedures. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

4.3 Develop a policy review committee made up of internal and external stakeholders designed to develop, review and enhance the agency's policy manual. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

4.4 Review the Westfall and Gallagher's key critical tasks mentioned above and develop/enhance existing policies to cover these areas. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

4.5 Consider seeking law enforcement accreditation at the opportune time. (UoR: L; CoR: H; RI: S)

Crime Prevention, Safety Awareness, and Community Engagement

5.1 Consider adding a District level position that focusing primarily on community policing, crime prevention, and campus community engagement. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)

5.2 Conduct community policing training at all levels of the department. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

5.3 Develop and implement a community policing and community engagement strategy. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

5.4 Train officers in crime prevention techniques and strategies; develop crime prevention tools and presentations; and create crime prevention and educational social media campaigns. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

Training and Career Development

6.1 Reach consensus on recruit level training requirements. Given other recommendations in this Report, we highly recommend that officers be required to have already obtained basic police officer recruit training or be able to obtain it within 18 months of initial employment. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

6.2 Develop a new employee training and orientation program. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

6.3 Develop a certified field or police training officer program. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

6.4 Develop a training matrix/schedule that identifies training that should be completed based on seniority, officer interest and time on the department. (UoR: L; CoR: H; RI: N)

6.5 Encourage and incentivize officers to attend appropriate training and obtain instructor certifications in the areas of crime prevention, community policing, criminal investigations, dispatch operations, use of force, conflict de-escalation, fair and impartial policing, trauma-informed investigations, and other related training topics. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

6.6 Develop a comprehensive annual training program designed to ensure all employees can meet/exceed the safety and security expectations of the campus community. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

6.7 Develop a training and exercise program with external first response organizations to train, test and evaluate the campuses ability to respond to a variety of critical incidents. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

Physical Security Program

7.1 Consider formally placing the responsibility for physical security, security systems and management under the Public Safety Department. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.2 Create a position responsible for district-wide security systems management. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)

7.3 Create a physical security working group that brings together key stakeholders throughout the district. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.4 Establish district-wide facility security standards. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.5 Develop district-wide security equipment minimum standards for each technology such as cameras, electronic access, recorders, etc. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.6 Develop and implement a door alarm monitoring and response policy for all District facilities. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.7 Develop an annual operational budget for physical security, including security technology systems. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)

7.8 Test of the EAS with selected vendor to make adjustments to problem areas. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

College of San Mateo

7.9 Consider renumbering all campus buildings to a logical grouping based on current and future construction. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.10 Standardize the size and location of building numbers. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.11 Conduct training for staff in 4th floor executive suite in the use of duress alarms and regular testing of the alarms. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

7.12 Consider conducting de-escalation training for executive suite staff. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

Skyline College

7.13 Consider creating a single point of entry to the Pacific Heights Building and add electronic access control. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

7.14 Add a camera to the main entrance to the Pacific Heights Building. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

7.15 Increase internal way-finding signage in Pacific Heights Building to provide better direction and emergency egress. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.16 Consider adding fixed cameras to the exterior of Buildings 1, 2 & the Theater to cover the courtyard. Additionally, consider adding a 360° pole camera to the center of the courtyard. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

7.17 Review the chained theater door for fire code compliance and egress. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.18 Consider adding a camera to the loading dock of Building 5. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

7.19 Prohibit propping of classroom doors and emphasize this during security orientations and with appropriately placed signage. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

Cañada College

7.20 Standardize locations that receive hard keys and use electronic access control. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.21 Determine what type of credential will be used to gain access where electronic readers are used. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.22   Consider adding shades, blinds or other item to cover classroom and office doors that have windows. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

7.23   Conduct a test of all gray phones to ensure functionality. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.24   Consider branding all phones using a highly visible color and signage. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

7.25   Develop a consistent testing schedule and document needed repairs. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

Emergency Operations Plan and Training for Critical Incidents

8.1   Consider creating the position of Emergency Manager at the District. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)

8.2   Develop an Immediate Action Response campaign to raise awareness to immediate actions "The Big Five." (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

8.3   Conduct Immediate Action Response training on all campuses.

8.4   Develop and distribute updated position responsibility list for all Building Captains. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

8.5   Provide additional training for building captains designed to test their specific roles and responsibilities. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

8.6   Identify and train additional Building Captains to a three-deep list, with at least three Building Captains for every position. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

8.7   Mandate all faculty, staff and students to participate in scheduled drills through announcements and department meetings. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

8.8   Conduct campus drills during and in between classes when the campus is active. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

Dispatch Operations/Communications Center

9.1   Establish a central Communications Center operation to manage calls for service, alarm and access control monitoring, security camera monitoring, and walk-in inquiries. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)

Collaboration with Key Internal Stakeholders

10.1 Develop and implement an initiative for enhancing relationships with partner departments. This would typically involve identifying key partner departments and assigning a liaison to that department. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

10.2 Identify representatives or liaisons within public safety to serve on appropriate campus committees with key stakeholders. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

10.3 Establish a Campus Safety Advisory Committee to include key stakeholders as members. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)

Coordination with External Partners

11.1 Schedule quarterly meetings with all the law enforcement partners and have the Director and all 3 SMCCCD Chiefs attend. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)

11.2 Develop a MOU between the SMCCD DPS and the San Mateo Sheriff's Office that delineates roles and responsibilities. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)

11.3 Explore ways to create interoperable communications with the local police agencies. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)

Recruitment/Selection/Retention

12.1 Develop a formal recruitment program. (UoR: L; CoR: H; RI: R)

12.2 Include other key stakeholders, including students, in the selection process. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)

12.3 Appropriately 12 months following the full implementation of a computer-aided dispatch system and the collection of call for service data, conduct a staffing study to identify adequate staffing and supervision. (UoR: L; CoR: H; RI: R)

Compensation

13.1 Consider additional "special duty" stipends for officers who volunteer for additional duties such as field training officer, instructor, special skills or other specialized tasks. (UoR: L; CoR: H; RI: R)

RECOMMENDATIONS MATRIX

		CONFIDENCE OF RECOMMENDATION			RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS		
		High	Medium	Low	Substantial	Routine	Negligible
URGENT							
1.1	Immediately clarify the role of the Public Safety Department, ensuring that the current staff is trained to meet the stated mission. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
1.2	Develop a communication plan to familiarize the campus community with Department role and mission, and strategy for meeting campus expectations that are outside of the Department's current capacity. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
1.3	Choose an option and develop and implement a communications strategy to inform the campus community. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
2.4	Form a campus safety working group comprised of internal key stakeholders to assist in developing and maintaining the organization's operational strategy. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
3.1	Create a Department command staff, including the creation of deputy director, two assistant director level positions and fill the positions with candidates who have higher education experience. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: S)	X			X		
3.2	Consider re-designating the current director as "Executive Director" and chief, and reclassify the College chiefs to commander, captain, or other suitable title. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: S)	X			X		
3.3	Consider creating an investigator position, staffed with a highly trained and experienced investigator. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: S)	X			X		
4.1	Ensure all Public Safety personnel review and demonstrate proficiency with all department policies and procedures. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
4.3	Develop a policy review committee made up of internal and external stakeholders designed to develop, review and enhance the agency's policy manual. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
4.4	Review the Westfall and Gallagher's key critical tasks mentioned above and develop/enhance existing policies to cover these areas. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
5.2	Conduct community policing training at all levels of the department. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
5.3	Develop and implement a community policing and community engagement strategy. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
5.4	Train officers in crime prevention techniques and strategies; develop crime prevention tools and presentations; and create crime prevention and educational social media campaigns. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	

		CONFIDENCE OF RECOMMENDATION			RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS		
		High	Medium	Low	Substantial	Routine	Negligible
6.2	Develop a new employee training and orientation program. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
6.3	Develop a certified field or police training officer program. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
6.7	Develop a training and exercise program with external first response organizations to train, test and evaluate the campuses ability to respond to a variety of critical incidents. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
7.1	Consider formally placing the responsibility for physical security, security systems and management under the Public Safety Department. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
7.6	Develop and implement a door alarm monitoring and response policy for all District facilities. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
7.8	Test the EAS with the selected vendor to make adjustments to problem areas. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
PHYSICAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS (CSM)							
7.9	Consider renumbering all campus buildings to a logical grouping based on current and future construction. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
7.11	Conduct training for staff in 4th floor executive suite in the use of duress alarms and regular testing of the alarms. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)	X					X
PHYSICAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS (SKYLINE COLLEGE)							
7.14	Prohibit propping of classroom doors. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
7.15	Add a camera to the main entrance to the Pacific Heights Building. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
7.16	Increase internal way-finding signage in Pacific Heights Building to provide better direction and emergency egress. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
7.18	Review the chained theater door for fire code compliance and egress. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
7.20	Prohibit propping of classroom doors and emphasize this during security orientations and with appropriately placed signage. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
PHYSICAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS (CAÑADA COLLEGE)							
7.23	Consider adding shades, blinds or other item to cover classroom and office doors that have windows. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
7.24	Conduct a test of all gray phones to ensure functionality. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
7.25	Consider branding all phones using a highly visible color and signage. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
8.2	Develop an Immediate Action Response campaign to raise awareness to immediate actions "The Big Five." (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X

		CONFIDENCE OF RECOMMENDATION			RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS		
		High	Medium	Low	Substantial	Routine	Negligible
8.3	Conduct Immediate Action Response training on all campuses. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
8.4	Develop and distribute updated position responsibility list for all Building Captains. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
8.5	Provide additional training for building captains designed to test their specific roles and responsibilities. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
8.7	Mandate all faculty, staff and students to participate in scheduled drills through announcements and department meetings. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
10.3	Establish a Campus Safety Advisory Committee to include key stakeholders as members. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
11.2	Develop a MOU between the SMCCCD DPS and the San Mateo Sheriff's Office that delineates roles and responsibilities. (UoR: I; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
MID-TERM							
2.1	Revise the current "vision" statement to align with the District's vision and develop a mission statement accompanied by core values. (UoR: M; CoR: M; RI: N)		X				X
2.2	Develop an operational strategy with appropriate benchmarks to guide DPS operations. As a minimum, the strategy should include the following elements: (UoR: M; CoR: M; RI: R)		X			X	
a.	Formal articulation of mission and values; role and authority and jurisdiction;						
b.	Patrol operations and priorities;						
c.	Investigative operations;						
d.	Call-taking, dispatch, and central monitoring operations;						
e.	Crime prevention, community policing, and campus community engagement initiatives;						
f.	Addressing the Use & Misuse of Alcohol and Other Drugs;						
g.	Campus Threat Assessment and Management;						
h.	Emergency management structure and goals;						
i.	Special event management;						
j.	Community Caretaking functions;						
k.	Physical security and security technology implementation plan; and,						
l.	Regulatory Compliance						
2.3	Once this operational plan is developed, ensure all members of the organization are aware of this plan and know their individual roles and responsibilities in achieving the organizations goals and objectives. (UoR: M; CoR: M; RI: R)		X			X	

		CONFIDENCE OF RECOMMENDATION			RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS		
		High	Medium	Low	Substantial	Routine	Negligible
4.2	Develop an annual in-service training program designed to train/test/evaluate all personnel on relevant department policies and procedures. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
5.1	Consider adding a District level position that focusing primarily on community policing, crime prevention, and campus community engagement. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)	X			X		
6.1	Reach consensus on recruit level training requirements. Given other recommendations in this Report, we highly recommend that officers be required to have already obtained basic police officer recruit training or be able to obtain it within 18 months of initial employment. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
6.5	Encourage and incentivize officers to attend appropriate training and obtain instructor certifications in the areas of crime prevention, community policing, criminal investigations, dispatch operations, use of force, conflict de-escalation, fair and impartial policing, trauma-informed investigations, and other related training topics. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
6.6	Develop a comprehensive annual training program designed to ensure all employees can meet/exceed the safety and security expectations of the campus community. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
7.2	Create a position responsible for district-wide security systems management. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)	X			X		
7.3	Create a physical security working group that brings together key stakeholders throughout the district. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
7.4	Establish district-wide facility security standards. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
7.5	Develop district-wide security equipment minimum standards for each technology such as cameras, electronic access, recorders, etc. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
7.7	Develop an annual operational budget for physical security, including security technology systems. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)	X			X		
PHYSICAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS (CSM)							
7.10	Standardize the size and location of building numbers. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
7.12	Consider conducting de-escalation training for executive suite staff. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
PHYSICAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS (SKYLINE COLLEGE)							
7.13	Consider creating a single point of entry to the Pacific Heights Building and add electronic access control. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	

		CONFIDENCE OF RECOMMENDATION			RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS		
		High	Medium	Low	Substantial	Routine	Negligible
7.17	Consider adding fixed cameras to the exterior of Buildings 1, 2 & the Theater to cover the courtyard. Additionally, consider adding a 360° pole camera to the center of the courtyard. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
7.19	Consider adding a camera to the loading dock of Building 5. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
PHYSICAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS (CAÑADA COLLEGE)							
7.21	Standardize locations that receive hard keys and use electronic access control. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
7.22	Determine what type of credential will be used to gain access where electronic readers are used. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
7.26	Develop a consistent testing schedule and document needed repairs. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
8.1	Consider creating the position of Emergency Manager at the District. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)	X			X		
8.6	Identify and train additional Building Captains to a three-deep list, with at least three Building Captains for every position. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
8.8	Conduct campus drills during and in between classes when the campus is active. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
9.1	Establish a central Communications Center operation to manage calls for service, alarm and access control monitoring, security camera monitoring, and walk-in inquiries. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)	X			X		
10.1	Develop and implement an initiative for enhancing relationships with partner departments. This would typically involve identifying key partner departments and assigning a liaison to that department. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
10.2	Identify representatives or liaisons within public safety to serve on appropriate campus committees with key stakeholders. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					
11.1	Schedule quarterly meetings with all the law enforcement partners and have the Director and all 3 SMCCCD Chiefs attend. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X
11.3	Explore ways to create interoperable communications with the local police agencies. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: S)	X			X		
12.2	Include other key stakeholders, including students, in the selection process. (UoR: M; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
LONG-TERM							
4.5	Consider seeking law enforcement accreditation at the opportune time. (UoR: L; CoR: H; RI: S)	X			X		
6.4	Develop a training matrix/schedule that identifies training that should be completed based on seniority, officer interest and time on the department. (UoR: L; CoR: H; RI: N)	X					X

		CONFIDENCE OF RECOMMENDATION			RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS		
		High	Medium	Low	Substantial	Routine	Negligible
12.1	Develop a formal recruitment program. (UoR: L; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
12.3	Appropriately 12 months following the full implementation of a computer-aided dispatch system and the collection of call for service data, conduct a staffing study to identify adequate staffing and supervision. (UoR: L; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	
13.1	Consider additional "special duty" stipends for officers who volunteer for additional duties such as field training officer, instructor, special skills or other specialized tasks. (UoR: L; CoR: H; RI: R)	X				X	

SECTION VI – REFERENCE MATERIALS

ATTACHMENT 1: INTERVIEW SUMMARY

I.   Total Number Of Days On Campus: 12 Days

- College of San Mateo: 3 Days (August 23-25, 2016)

- Skyline College: 3 Days (August 30 – September 1, 2016)

- Cañada College: 3 Days (September 27-29, 2016)

- Campus Safety & Security Forums: 3 Days (September 13-15, 2016)

II.   Total Number Of Interviews Conducted: 78

III. Number Of Individuals Interviewed: 250+

- College of San Mateo: 78 +

- Skyline College: 75+

- Cañada College: 102 +/-

IV. Functional Areas Represented In Interviews:

- Academic Senate

- Academic Senate Governing Council

- Administration

- Administrative Services

- Administrative Support Staff

- ASSC Club Advisors & Senators

- Associated Students of Skyline College (ASSC)

- Athletics

- Building Captains

- Cañada College Public Safety Staff

- CARES Team

- Chancellor's Cabinet

- Classified Senate

- Collective Bargaining / Union Representatives

- College of San Mateo Public Safety Staff

- Counseling

- Deans

- Disability Resource Center

- DRC

- Emergency Preparedness

- Facilities

- Finance

- Health Services

- Human Resources

- Information Technology

- Instruction

- Language Arts

- Learning Center

- Library Support

- Maintenance

- Marketing, Communications & Public Relations

- Physical Security

- Planning Council Chairs

- Psych Services

- San Bruno Police Department

- San Mateo County Sherriff's Office

- San Mateo Police Department

- SEEED Members

- Skyline College Public Safety Staff

- SPARC members

- Student Development

- Student Life & Leadership

- Student Representatives

- Student Services

- Student Success Program

- Title IX
    - Union Presidents
    - Union Representatives

V.   Total Number of Campus Safety & Security Forum Attendees: 323

- Attendees at College of San Mateo Forums – 130

- Attendees at Skyline College Forums – 128

- Attendees at Cañada College Forums – 65

VI. Total Number of Individuals Who Submitted Anonymous Feedback Through Survey Tool (Google Form): 703

- Cañada College – 189 (27.1%)

- College of San Mateo – 302 (43.3%)

- Skyline College – 270 (38.7%)

- District Office – 22 (3.2%)

ATTACHMENT 2: *DRAFT* ROLE AND MISSION STATEMENT

The Public Safety Department (the Department), authorized by the San Mateo County Community College (SMCCCD) Board of Trustees, and reporting to the Vice President of xx is the District office officially charged with maintaining a reasonably safe environment on campus, and on other properties owned or controlled by SMCCCD. The Department is a non-sworn campus safety agency, governed by the regulations established by the [appropriate legislation giving the District to establish a campus safety department]. As a non-sworn agency, Public Safety officers have limited capabilities for responding to incidents on campus, and primarily exist to respond to incidents to determine if police or other first responders are required to adequately address the situation.

The fundamental duties of the Department include protecting life and property, protecting constitutional rights, promoting responsible citizenship, preventing crime, responding to criminal activity, detaining violators of the law (in accordance with existing legislation), and addressing non—criminal conduct or violations of District policies that disrupts SMCCCD's mission.

The Public Safety Department achieves its primary mission by working collaboratively with other District and College offices, students, staff, and faculty to create programs and initiatives aimed at enhancing campus safety and security. The philosophy of community oriented policing and problem solving guides the Department's operations.

The Department, in conjunction with appropriate District and College officials, shall develop policies governing its operations through a written directive system that addresses administrative, routine and emergency situations.

ATTACHMENT 3: TRAINING REQUIREMENT FOR A MODERN CAMPUS SAFETY ORGANIZATION

Based on our experience with campus safety agencies across the United States, we believe every college and university with campus safety departments should strongly consider the following supplemental training to further educate and orient its officers to the challenges of policing in a highly diverse communities.

- Community policing and problem-solving principles

- Interpersonal and communication skills, including de-escalation

- Response to Bias Incidents and Understanding Hate Crimes

- Cultural Competency and Implicit Bias

- Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Training and Understanding Mental Health Issues

- Trauma-Informed Investigations and Victim Services

- Implementation of Procedural Justice

- Use of Force and firearms training (where applicable), including scenario-based, situational decision making

ATTACHMENT 4: SUMMARY OF FEEDBACK RECEIVED FROM ANONYMOUS GOOGLE DOC

PURPOSE

Margolis Healy prepared the Google Form in partnership with San Mateo County Community College District as a method to collect additional data from the campus community outside of the campus visits. The intention behind the form is to collect data from the campus community if individuals were unable to attend an interview or an open forum, or preferred to submit sensitive information anonymously to the Margolis Healy staff. The anonymous feedback collected was reviewed and sorted by the Margolis Healy team into key themes to support overall findings from the campus visits and research.

Link

https://goo.gl/forms/RduGy0UwxEJ0LwSN2

Questions

1. Please indicate which campus (or campuses) you are submitting feedback on behalf of:

2. What is your overall impression of campus public safety?(Required)

3. Do you have any specific feedback you would like to offer regarding campus public safety?

4. Additional comments or questions.

Response Statistics

Total Number of Individual Responses

Total = 703

- Cañada College – 189
- College of San Mateo – 302
- Skyline College – 270
- District Office – 22

Number of Responses by Topic*

- Overall Impressions Of Campus Public Safety - 699
- Campus Public Safety – Authority, Presence, Communication and Response – 275
- Arming – 132

- – Pro-Arming - 49

- – Anti-Arming - 66

Responses by Campus Location

- Cañada College
- College of San Mateo
- Skyline College
- District Office

- – Other Statements About Arming - 17

- Building and Campus Access - 21

- Crisis/Emergency Situations and Notifications - 68

- On-Campus Safety – Walking, Cameras, Lighting - 56

- Parking & Driving - 36

- Race, Diversity and Cultural Competency - 4

- Sexual Misconduct / Intimate Partner Violence -3

- Other - 59

Many individuals' responses included comments on multiple topics. The comments were broken down and separated by category.

High Frequency Word Count (Words used great than 25 times)

291	campus	57	armed	33	faculty
210	safety	57	need	33	night
145	public	56	parking	31	well
123	students	49	time	31	know
121	officers	45	like	26	get
116	safe	44	emergency	25	training
104	good	44	people	25	helpful
98	feel	43	can	25	office
93	security	40	one	25	call
71	think	37	lot	25	much
60	guns	35	police		
60	buildings	35	will		
58	staff	34	around		
58	see				

ATTACHMENT 5: SMCCCD OPEN FORUM NOTES – SEPTEMBER 13 – 15, 2016

MHA conducted 15 Open Forums over 3 days, with 5 forums being held at each College. Various sessions were designated for specific groups, although all attendees were welcomed to attend any session.

Total # of Attendees Over the 15 Forums: 323 District Community Members

Recurring Themes Raised During All Forums

- Change versus tradition

- Communication

- Deception

- Escape

- Fear

- Loss

- Power

- Prejudice

- Security

- Technology

- Protection

- Training

Prompting Questions Used at All Forums:

1. What are your perceptions of safety at [fill in the blank depending on College]?

2. What is the biggest challenge to safety on campus?

3. What is your perception of the role of Public Safety?

4. Please characterize your interactions with Public Safety.

5. If you were to rate Public Safety on a scale of 1 – 10, how would you rate them?

6. To move the score up to a 10, what would it take?

7. One of the issues that we're examining is whether the District should consider arming as a way to further enhance campus safety. What are your reactions to this?

Cañada College – Total# of Attendees: 65

Notes Cañada Campus Forum Session 1

Date:	Tuesday, September 13, 2016
Location:	Building 6, Room 102
Time:	8:30 a.m. – 10:00 a.m.
Facilitators:	Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea V. Credle (TVC)
Notes:	T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)
Group:	Staff only
Attendees:	8 (1 White male, 3 White females, 1 Latina, and 3 Filipinos)
Mood:	Neutral – Questioning

Notes Cañada Campus Forum Session 2

Date:	Tuesday, September 13, 2016
Location:	Building 6, Room 102
Time:	10:30 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.
Facilitators:	Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea V. Credle (TVC)
Notes:	T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)
Group:	Faculty
Attendees:	10 (all females: 7 Caucasian, 1 African American, 2 Latina – group included a facilities manager)
Mood:	Positive – open and interested in process

Notes Cañada Campus Forum Session 3

Date:	Tuesday, September 13, 2016
Location:	Building 6, Room 102
Time:	12:30 p.m. – 2:00 p.m.
Facilitators:	Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea V. Credle (TVC)
Notes:	T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)

Group: Employees

Attendees: 37 people (28 women, 9 men)

Mood: Positive

Notes Cañada Campus Forum Session 4

Date: Tuesday, September 13, 2016

Location: Building 6, Room 102

Time: 3:30 p.m. – 5:00 p.m.

Facilitators: Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea V. Credle (TVC)

Notes: T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)

Group: Students

Attendees: 4 people (3 women, 1 man)

Mood: Neutral – interested in student rights

Notes Cañada Campus Forum Session 5

Date: Tuesday, September 13, 2016

Location: Building 6, Room 102

Time: 5:30 p.m. – 7:00 p.m.

Facilitators: Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea V. Credle (TVC)

Notes: T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)

Group: Open

Attendees: 6 (3 males and 3 females)

Mood:

College of San Mateo – Total# of Attendees: 130
Notes College of San Mateo Campus Forum Session 1

Date: Wednesday, September 14, 2016

Location: College of San Mateo – Building 10, Room 468

Time: 8:30 a.m. – 10:00 a.m.

Facilitators: Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea V. Credle (TVC)

Notes: T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)

Group: Staff

Attendees: 19 (4 males and 15 females) and 2 building captains for 8 and 10

Mood:

Notes College of San Mateo Campus Forum Session 2

Date: Wednesday, September 14, 2016

Location: Building 10, Room 468

Time: 10:30 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.

Facilitators: Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea V. Credle (TVC)

Notes: T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)

Group: Faculty

Attendees: 3 (2 males and 1 female). Reporter Josh Austin for the San Mateo Daily Journal attended. Also, Trustee from yesterday, he was a former president.

Mood: Positive

Notes College of San Mateo Campus Forum Session 3

Date: Wednesday, September 14, 2016

Location: Building 10, Room 468

Time: 12:30 p.m. – 2:00 p.m.

Facilitators: Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea V. Credle (TVC)

Notes: T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)

Group: Employees

Attendees: 49 (22 males and 27 females – includes 10 students)

Mood: Tense

Notes College of San Mateo Campus Forum Session 4

Date: Wednesday, September 14, 2016

Location: Building 10, Room 468

Time: 3:30 p.m. – 5:00 p.m.

Facilitators: Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea
V. Credle (TVC)

Notes: T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)

Group: Students

Attendees: 44 (23 males and 21 females)

Mood: Tense; heated

Notes College of San Mateo Campus Forum Session 5

Date: Wednesday, September 14, 2016

Location: Building 10, Room 468

Time: 5:30 p.m. – 7:00 p.m.

Facilitators: Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea
V. Credle (TVC)

Notes: T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)

Group: Open

Attendees: 15 (10 males and 5 females)

Mood: Neutral – mixed angry and questioning – students stayed
for another session

Skyline College – Total# of Attendees: 128

Notes Skyline Campus Forum Session 1

Date: Thursday, September 15, 2016

Location: Building 6, Room 202/204/206

Time: 8:30 a.m. – 10:00 a.m.

Facilitators: Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea
V. Credle (TVC)

Notes: T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)

Group: Staff

Attendees: 42 (19 males, 23 females)

Mood: Neutral – questioning

Date: Wednesday, September 14, 2016

Location: Skyline College

Time: 10:30 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.

Facilitators: Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea V. Credle (TVC)

Notes: T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)

Group: Faculty

Attendees: 6 (5 males, 1 female)

Mood: Positive

Notes Skyline Campus Forum Session 3

Date: Wednesday, September 15, 2016

Location: Skyline College

Time: 12:30 p.m. – 2:00 p.m.

Facilitators: Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea V. Credle (TVC)

Notes: T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)

Group: Employees

Attendees: 33 (12 males, 21 females)

Mood: Neutral – issue of arming officers riled up attendees

Notes Skyline Campus Forum Session 4

Date: Wednesday, September 15, 2016

Location: Skyline College

Time: 3:30 pm. – 5:00 p.m.

Facilitators: Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea V. Credle (TVC)

Notes: T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)

Group: 3:30 p.m. – 5:00 p.m.

Attendees: 33 (males 18, females 11)

Mood: Started negative but became positive

Notes Skyline Campus Forum Session 5

Date: Wednesday, September 15, 2016

Location: Skyline College

Time: 5:30 p.m. – 7:00 p.m.

Facilitators: Steven J. Healy (SJH), Lauren D. Ugoriji (LDU) and Thea V. Credle (TVC)

Notes: T. Missy Gillespie (TMG)

Group: Open

Attendees: 14 (5 males, 9 females) many repeat attendees from previous sessions

Mood: Positive and negative – few students from previous session

ATTACHMENT 6: COMMENTS FROM VISIONING SESSIONS

COLLEGE OF SAN MATEO VISIONING SESSION (Conducted August 23, 2016)

Attendees:

Sandra Stefani Comerford, VP Instruction

Jennifer Hughes, VP Student Services

Jan Roecks, VP Administrative Services

James Carranza, Dean of Language Arts

Charlene Frontiera, Dean of Math & Science

Andreas Wolf, Dean of PE/Athletics

Laura Demsetz, Dean of Creative Arts & Social Science

Kathy Ross, Dean of Business & Technology

Jennifer Mendoza, Dean of Academic Support/Learning Technologies

Krystal Romero, Dean of Counseling

Henry Villareal, Dean of Admissions and Records

John Stewart, Dean of Planning & Research

Milla McConnell-Tuite, Professor

Bev Madden, Public Information Officer

Leadership/Stakeholders Perceptions of Safety and Security on Campus

- Feel safe, progression since the 80's
  – Card access, video monitoring, technology
- Friendly face on campus, presence
- Landscape changing, national context
- Feels safe, yet worried about general openness
- Less concerned about outsiders, more about students
- Had to call security once and have to leave message
- Generally, high approval rate
- As of recent, more practice drills
- Only real crimes are fistfights between young adults
- Online & in-person training for Title IX (armed robber)

- Op-in text messaging notification system

- All managers have portable radio system

- IRT

- Lockdown is external

- Training on clarification of personal roles

- Additional procedures on certain areas

- Campus safety will train on request

- A lot of isolated areas with limited information access

Campus Community's Perception

- Annual survey holds value, but after incident, sense of vulnerability

- Better job educating

- Many have been approached about concerns of safety

- Belligerent, disruptive individuals raise cause for concern, threat assessment team?

- Unstable individuals, stalker incident, night faculty

- Night security is scarce, evening classes have higher risk factor, increased sense of vulnerability

- Sense that we do no need to solely rely on cam

- 911 security connection? Why have public safety?

- Behavioral threat assessment team advocacy

- Threat assessment team can be called at any moment, chaired by president

Forces that Affect Campus Safety

- Disconnect between mass notification

  – PA systems cannot be heard inside

  – Older buildings need manual lockdown

  – Interior classroom locks

- Open campus, anyone can walk in

- Importance of ID cards with broad age range

- Visitor management, vendors, contractors, etc.

Arming

- Several NO's

- Decision lies in benefit, research

- Less lethal options?

- Data needed, trust & faith is there

- Are there other options?

- Police officer in community is different than police officer on campus.

Magic Paintbrush

- Centralization of campus safety

  – Connection to officers

- Communication, specific signaling

- Who's on campus? Visitor management at all times

- Emergency notifications in classrooms/work spaces

- Access control in all workspace and all buildings

- Lighting assessments, possible pollution

- More presence of officers

- Duplication communication capabilities

- Physical security enhancements, deterrence & cameras

- Evening hours

  – Perception, presence, awareness

SKYLINE COLLEGE VISIONING SESSION (Conducted August 30, 2016)

Attendees:

Dr. Regina Stanback-Stroud - President

Eloise Briones - VP of Administration

Aaron McVean - Interim VP Instruction

Kathryn Browne - ECE Professor

Joe Morello - Dean of Kinesiology

Luis Escobar - Dean of Counseling

Melissa Matthews - Coordinator

Dr. Angelica Garcia - VP Student Services

Amory Caradias - Director of Student Services

Dylan O'Shea - ASSC President

Leadership/Stakeholders Perceptions of Safety and Security on Campus

- Very safe campus. Interactions with students, at times students feel a delicate balance between seeing a presence and having too much of a presence. But overall, feels safe and secure campus

- Some students want to see more security, some don't want to see more.

- Coming from DRC, calls PS often, very responsive and feel safe as a department.

- Areas of concern from DRC. Both Chiefs have done assessments and they still struggle with a panic system, looking for panic alarms. They haven't got them yet

- Lockdown drills, need to have blinds or alike positioned all the time so staff can follow lockdown protocols

- Day to day, staff feel very safe, most interactions with officers positive, but would also like to see more visual patrols in evening and marketing of PS services such as escorts, etc.

- Exceptionally safe and secure campus compared to other institutions. Lighting improved over last 10 years, free flowing campus. Public events are times when a greater presence would be needed and welcomed.

- Never feel nervous or on edge when on campus

- Places on campus where there is much less of s presence such as the ECC however faculty believe and discuss PS being more of a community group rather than a policing group

- Sometimes feel like the PS are not integrated into the community, but others feel like there are so few staff members, could they do more if they were staffed more.

- At times community doesn't seek support from PS to tackle problems

- Could be beneficial if PS would communicate with callers at times as to why they might be delayed to a call. I.e.; one officer on duty who is tied up on a higher priority, etc.

- Not happy with centralization because they feel folks are moving round and not establishing roots at campus or once they do, the relocate.

- Announcements that come out regarding changes to staffing from district go unread because folks aren't familiar with who they are at the college level. It seems to lose the cultural and community building experience. At times, there are "fit' issues by moving personnel around.

- Buildings open and secure differently, you can't hear the EAS in many places. ECC can't hear the EAS at all from inside the building.

How do you get to the desired state?

- Additional PS staff. Opportunity to have more of a relationship with officers,

- Need a more "community policing" philosophy that lets officers know people. Students have expressed that they would also like an opportunity to know of different training offerings. In many cases, adjunct faculty don't know what to do in an emergency and students would like to know what to do. Also, what other services do they provide?

- All male officers, sometimes can feel awkward to survivors of sexual assault, etc. Potential for student officer or cadet program to provide assistance.

- Disconnect and confusion at times between who provides services such as escorts for health services. Students call health center, they call PS, etc.

- Evaluate the use of duress alarms for higher risk positions such as counseling services, financial aid, etc.

- Visibility of officers might change the campus and have people asking "why all the security"? The perception could be that there are problems that don't exist.

- Perception is PS is here to help them, but doesn't really have any authority. They essentially call San Bruno PD for any crimes and that response can take quite some time.

- Regina -not a safer environment to have armed PS walking around campus. It would put students and visitors in greater danger.

Magic Paintbrush

- More education around implicit bias, race class and gender. Starts with defining culture at the institution and that is with all levels of leadership. Willingness, enthusiasm and professional development. Practicing what we preach around mission and values statement. Professional development should be for everyone at the institution.

- PS can do a lot of professional development. This should be mandatory.

- Engage the community in a safe and secure environment conversation. The community owns the college, uses it and should have a voice.

- Learning and listening campaigns. Debriefing and after action of events on campus such as a student arrested and removed from campus.

- Public safety in more spaces or information areas in more buildings. Typically only seen in bldg. 6 and parking lots.

- Faster response times from external agencies during emergency situations and accurate expectations

- A level of sensitivity training is needed as there is a varying level of skill sets. Consistency in training and expectations would be ideal.

CAÑADA COLLEGE VISIONING SESSION (Conducted September 28, 2016)

Attendees:

Jamillah Moore, President

Gregory Anderson, VP Instruction

Kim Lopez, VP Student Services

Michelle Marquez, VP Administration

Heidi Diamond, Dean of Business, Design & Workforce_

David Johnson, Dean of Humanities & Social Sciences

Anniqua Rana, Dean of Athletics, Kinesiology & Dance

Janet Stringer, Dean of Science & Technology

Lizette Bricker, Dean of Counseling

Chialin Hsieh, Dean of Planning, Research & Institutional Effectiveness

Megan Rodriguez Antone, Director of Marketing, Communications & PR

Leadership/Stakeholders Perceptions of Safety and Security on Campus

- Generally safe campus

- Some concern over parking lot 7 and those who come to take in the view, "what are they doing"

- Parking lot 10 some challenges with parking. Lot 10 and 6 are getting coned off at night to prevent issues. Lot 10 is getting a chain due to aesthetics

- Sort of "so far, so good" attitude. Maybe we have been more lucky than good.

- Students far more likely to participate in drills over the past couple of years than 5 years ago. Faculty and staff still give some pushback, but agreement that student participation has gotten better.

- Three dills per year. One earthquake two intruder

- Haven't invested in blue light phones because of needs…. students have cell phones

- Gender-neutral restrooms. People calling and panicking over men in a women's room. Public Safety doesn't know what to do if the receive complaints or these types of call.

- Resources affect security. There is not enough staff, they struggle to create consistency because resources are scarce.

- Complaints – I call security and no one picks up the phone. Need a central dispatch to operate things.

- Not everyone in the room knows who Bill Woods is or that there is a layer between the Chief and someone else.

- Maybe we need different levels of public safety officer – locking doors and using public safety is not a good ROI.

- **Have they created an incentive to write parking tickets?*8 (DP NOTE)

- Public Safety is part of Fund 3 – parking fees and tickets.

- Need to work with the District more to get from where we are to where we want to go.

- Perception that since the Grand Jury report, there are mandates coming down from the district that have not been communicated well. For example, changing of door locks. So communication from the district needs to be enhanced

- Hit the reset button. Too many changes and policy decisions coming down and not organized or communicated well.

- How do we reconcile "we want to be safe, but guns on campus would make us feel more unsafe".

  – Could they be armed, but no carried. This issue had been raised by some students during forums and during discussions.

Magic Paintbrush

- Additional Staff

- Fees from parking to fund security is problematic

- Better (substantive) relationships with the PS department and community

- Alternate uniforms

- What he really wants is everyone to feel safe on campus and that's not just about public safety

- Dispatch Operations and centralization

Would student be receptive to working in the security department (work study)

- Likely be receptive

- Thinks they would enjoy it

ATTACHMENT 7: TEAM BIOGRAPHIES

COLLEGE OF SAN MATEO VISIT

Tuesday, August 23 – Thursday, August 25, 2016

Steven J. Healy, Co-Founder and Managing Partner

Steven J. Healy is a managing partner and co-founder of Margolis Healy and is a nationally recognized expert on campus public safety, Title IX and the Clery Act. From 2003 through 2009, he was the Director of Public Safety at Princeton University where he led the University's safety, security, and law enforcement programs and is credited with enhancing and expanding the department's overall professionalism and capabilities through improved leadership, additional personnel, significant strategic investments in training, updated equipment, new computer systems and a relocation to a technologically advanced facility. Prior to Princeton, Steven was the Chief of Police at Wellesley College in Wellesley, MA. He also served as Director of Operations at the Department of Public Safety at Syracuse University for five years.

A past president of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA), Steven served as a member of the association's Government Relations Committee for 13 years, and was the IACLEA Regional Director for the North Atlantic Region during his tenure at Wellesley. As president of IACLEA, Steven contributed significantly to the national dialogue about campus safety and security in the aftermath of the tragic rampage-shooting incident at Virginia Tech University in April 2007. As the Immediate Past President of IACLEA, Steven led an IACLEA special panel reviewing post-Virginia Tech challenges and concerns for the higher education community. He also served as IACLEA's representative to the National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) "National Campus Safety and Security Project" and to EDUCAUSE's "The IT Role in Campus Safety" project. He was a featured speaker and panelist with Dr. Margolis on emergency response and recovery at the NACUBO annual meeting. In 2009, he was named a Fellow at the Department of Education's Higher Education Center for Alcohol, Other Drug Abuse and Violence Prevention. Steven is also a past president of the Massachusetts Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators.

Steven J. Healy serves as a subject-matter expert for the U.S. Departments of Education and Justice. He testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on the topic of "Security on America's Campuses" and testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor on the topic of "Best Practices for Keeping America's Campuses Safe." At the request of the U.S. Department of Education, he was asked to serve on a special working group developing emergency management planning guidelines for the higher education community.

Steven has been a featured presenter at several ACE Annual Meetings, addressing various issues of related to campus safety, security, emergency management, and regulatory compliance. He served as chairperson of the National Center for Campus Public Safety Advisory Board and was responsible for leading the development of a strategic plan and framework for the National Center for Campus Public Safety. Steven is currently the Chair of the Advisory Board for the National Center for Campus Public Safety, which was funded by Congress with bipartisan support in 2013.

Steven is a frequently requested and nationally recognized consultant, presenter, and trainer who speaks on issues related to campus safety and security. He has appeared on numerous national news programs and talk shows including CNN, ABC Nightly News, CBS, FOX, MSNBC, and National Public Radio. Steven was named one of the "Top 25 Most Influential People in the Security Industry" by Security Magazine.

Steven J. Healy is a 1984 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy. He spent 10 years on active duty with the United States Air Force as Security Police Officer. From 1992 to 1995, He was the Operations Officer for the 95th Security Police Squadron at Edwards Air Force Base.

Daniel R. Pascale, CPP, Vice President and Partner

Daniel Pascale is responsible for Margolis Healy consulting strategies, business development initiatives, and security and emergency management related services for clients. In this role, he has worked with dozens of institutions to conduct emergency plan and program reviews, and hazard, risk and vulnerability assessments. He has also conducted executive training programs, both facility and campus-wide security assessments and developed relevant emergency preparedness and security related policies and procedures.

Prior to joining Margolis Healy full time in October 2012, Dan was the Senior Director of Emergency Preparedness, Communications & Security Services for the University of Chicago (UC). He was responsible for overseeing all aspects of physical security systems including the design, procurement and implementation of security technology and contract security staff. In addition, Dan oversaw the UC Communications Center, mass notification systems and the UC Police Department Emergency Operations Plan and NIMS compliance. Prior to joining the University of Chicago, he spent 10 years with Rutgers University in NJ where he held the position of Commander of Security Operations and later the Director of Emergency Management.

Dan is a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) and is a two-time award winner for CPP instruction. He was selected as one of America's "Top 20 Security Professionals under 40" by Security Director News in July 2009. He has completed the Emergency Management Institutes Incident Command, Unified Command and Community Educator programs, in addition to Basic and Enhanced Risk Assessment through the Department of Homeland Security and Texas Engineering Extension Service (TEEX). In 2015, Dan contributed the lead chapter to the book "Emerging Trends in K-12 Campus Security" from the "Inside the Minds" series from Aspatore. In addition, he has written several articles published in periodicals such as Security Management, Security Dynamics and Campus Security Report relating to event planning, risk analysis and physical security. Dan is a Past President of the NJ College & University Public Safety Association, former Chair of the ASIS International School Safety & Security Council and also served as a member of the NJ Governor's Campus Security Task Force in the wake of the Virginia Tech tragedy.

Robert L. Evans, Manager for Organizational Assessment Services

Robert Evans is Manager for Organizational Assessment and participates in organizational assessments, arming support studies, emergency management services, and other duties. In addition, Rob is the Vermont liaison for K-12 schools and works in partnership with the Vermont Agency of Education and Department of Public Safety. He is responsible for coordinating school crisis preparedness and planning statewide, including scenarios such as an active shooter, natural disasters and other hazardous and life threatening events.

In March 2013, Rob retired at the rank of Captain from the Vermont State Police after serving 23 years in a variety of operational, training, homeland security and executive leadership positions within the organization. For 19 years, he was a member of the State Police SWAT team where he was an entry team member, sniper, breacher, active shooter instructor and team commander. Rob has extensive experience commanding hundreds of critical incidents throughout the state and has instructed local, county and state law enforcement officers in the areas of critical incident response and tactical command planning and management. In his last role as the Assistant Field Force Commander, Rob was the single Vermont State Police point of contact for all major events requiring special security operations. He had operational control of nine special response teams including SWAT, SCUBA, bomb squad, crisis negotiators, K-9 units, Clandestine Lab Response Team, search and rescue, crash reconstruction and the critical incident dispatch team. He has conducted pre-operational planning and implemented security operations for traffic control, security checkpoints, bomb detection, canine operations, access and control points, tactical and immediate action support, intelligence gathering, threat assessment and command and control operations. Rob also maintained command oversight of the State Police Marine Unit and the traffic operations section. In 2006, Rob led the tactical team that entered the building in response to an active shooter in the Essex (VT) Elementary School.

Rob has been an aggressive advocate for school crisis planning and, while continuing to work as a member of Vermont's School Crisis Planning Committee, he works with other planning committee members to refine the Vermont School Crisis Planning Guide. Rob designed and implemented a statewide active shooter training program for local, county, state and federal law enforcement officers and worked with Vermont principals and superintendents to improve collaboration between educational institutions and emergency first responders.

He was the law enforcement coordinator for VT Emergency Management responsible for directing law enforcement and security operations during manmade or natural disasters. He has collaborated with Vermont's Agencies of Transportation and Natural Resources, the Departments of Health, Public Safety and the Vermont National Guard to develop security action plans for implementation during statewide emergencies and critical incidents.

Rob is a distinguished military graduate from Ferrum College and is a George C. Marshal Award winner for outstanding leadership. Rob's tactical career began with the US Army as an Airborne Ranger assigned

as a Scout Platoon Leader with the 4th Infantry Division. He is a graduate of the FBI National Academy, a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Patrol and Tactical Operations sub-committee, and a member of the National Tactical Officers Association.

Vicky Stormo, Manager for Organizational Assessment Services

Vicky M. Stormo joined Margolis Healy full-time as the Manager of Organizational Assessment Services. Her responsibilities include managing and conducting public safety management studies; arming support (also known as lethal and less-than lethal force options) and related services; Clery Act and Title IX assessments; and emergency management related services. Vicky has more than 35 years of law enforcement experience and has been with Margolis Healy since 2008 as an Associate.

Immediately prior to joining Margolis Healy full time in 2014, Vicky served as a deputy chief of police and consultant for Oregon Health & Science University in Portland, Oregon. She was hired to help the public safety department transition into a police department from 2010 to 2014.

From 1999 to 2008, Vicky served as the Chief of Police at the University of Washington (UW) in Seattle. The University of Washington Police Department (UWPD) was a fully accredited law enforcement agency, comprised of 55 commissioned officers that oversaw 680 acres with a service population of 67,000 people. She also increased the number of women at the UWPD to 24%, doubling the national average. As Chief of Police at UW, Vicky was responsible for addressing many challenges including the management of: 1) activism in the Northwest that led to the WTO riots and arson of the Urban Horticulture Center; 2) dignitary protection; 3) football games with 74,000 Husky fans; 4) a top 10 Medical Center and Health Sciences department; and 5) a major research institution.

Before joining the University of Washington, Vicky was a lieutenant with the Albuquerque Police Department, retiring in 1999. While in Albuquerque, she worked in many facets of the department, including patrol, detectives, civil litigation, operations review, watch commander, communications center commander, and recruiting and selection. During her tenure, she was credited with increasing the number of women applicants from 8% to 25% while serving as the Recruitment and Selection commander and has spoken nationally about the strategy

used to attract women along with the Institute for Women in Trades, Technology and Sciences (IWITTS).

Vicky has received several honors throughout her law enforcement career. She was the Officer of the Month in her rookie year and was featured on Paul Harvey for solving a series of armed robberies utilizing computers when computer technology was new to law enforcement. She received the New Mexico Commission on the Status of Women Trailblazer award and the YWCA Woman on the Move award. She also received the Breaking the Glass Ceiling award from the National Center for Women and Policing.

Vicky holds a Bachelor's of Science degree in Criminology from the University of Albuquerque and a Master's in Public Administration from the University of New Mexico. She is a past President of the National Association of Women Law Enforcement Executives, serving two terms.

Justice Healy, Physical Security Specialist

Justice J. Healy is a Physical Security Specialist responsible for conducting campus-wide and facility security assessments for both higher education and K-12 institutions. These assessments provide Margolis Healy clients with opportunities to improve and or implement reasonable, cost-effective, security-smart solutions ranging from visitor management, security cameras, electronic access control and alarm systems to lighting, way-finding signage and emergency communications.

Justice began his career with Margolis Healy as an Intern while attending High School and joined the team full time after serving in the United States Marine Corps.

SKYLINE COLLEGE VISIT

Tuesday, August 30 – Thursday, September 2, 2016

Daniel R. Pascale, CPP, Vice President and Partner

Vicky Stormo, Manager for Organizational Assessment Services

Justice Healy, Physical Security Specialist

Joseph M. Polisar, Senior Associate

 Joseph M. Polisar is the recently retired chief of police in the City of Garden Grove, CA, a post he held for 12 years. With more than 30 years in municipal law enforcement, Joe has a reputation for innovative leadership and effective communication. During his tenure with Garden Grove, he was credited with reducing the Part I Crime Rate by almost 30% while generating millions of dollars in cost savings through the reduction of overtime, acquiring grants, and automating processes through technology acquisition. Prior to Garden Grove, Joe was Chief of Police for the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico where he rose through the ranks from patrol officer to lead the largest police department in the state with more than 2,000 police officers and civilian staff.

Amongst his notable accomplishments, Joe achieved and maintained accreditation for both the Garden Grove and Albuquerque Police Departments. In November 2010, Garden Grove PD was recognized as a Flagship Agency by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), the highest honor bestowed by the Commission on an accredited agency. He served as a CALEA Commissioner for 6 years, leading the organization's strategic planning efforts and various committee assignments.

Joe has held many leadership posts throughout his career, the most notable being President of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the oldest and largest executive law enforcement association in the world with more than 20,000 members in 90 countries. He holds top-secret clearance designations from the FBI, US Department of Justice, and US Department of Homeland Security. He holds executive certifications from Harvard University, the States of CA and NM, and the IACP. He is the recipient of numerous awards including the NAACP Marin Luther King, Jr. Keep the Dream Alive Award (1996); Albuquerque Human Rights Award (1995); Albuquerque

People's Choice Award (1996); Garden Grove Chamber of Commerce Community Achievement Honoree (2003); and the CALEA Egon Bittner Leadership Award (2010).

CAÑADA COLLEGE VISIT

Tuesday, September 27 – Thursday, September 29, 2016

Steven J. Healy, Co-Founder and Managing Partner

Daniel R. Pascale, CPP, Vice President and Partner

Justice Healy, Physical Security Specialist

Joseph M. Polisar, Senior Associate

COLLEGE OPEN FORUMS

Tuesday, September 13 – Thursday, September 15, 2016

Steven J. Healy, Co-Founder and Managing Partner

Thea Credle, Manager for Emergency Management Services

Thea Credle MPH, MEP provides services in emergency management and security operations. Her areas of expertise include campus emergency management initiatives, including the development of all-hazard emergency operations plans, hazard and vulnerability assessments, discussion and operations-based exercises, and emergency management training. Thea is the Director of Emergency Response and Environmental Health and Safety at Fayetteville State University within the UNC System in North Carolina. She is a National Board and Advisory Member for Black Emergency Managers Association (BEMA) with responsibilities in Emergency Management, Exercise Analysis, and Public Health, as well as a member of the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM). Thea has a proven track record of leadership experience in public health, emergency management, homeland security, and public safety. She offers extensive experience in developing collaborative partnerships with the public and private sector organizations.

Prior to joining Fayetteville State University, her varied work in Emergency Management has been in positions where she led the development and implementation of Emergency Response Plans and

Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP) for Witt Associates, The Malloy Group, The City of Boston, Massachusetts and both Boston University and George Washington University. Her versatility throughout the past decade in program management, homeland security, emergency management, and public health is evident. These distinct characteristics have propelled her to achieve outstanding results, exposing her talents to the ever-changing world of emergency management and BEMA. She has held speaking engagements as an Independent Consultant in Kuwait as well as within the United States.

Thea received her Bachelor of Arts in Communications from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and Master of Public Health (MPH) in Behavioral Health from Boston University and recently graduated from the Executive Leadership program at the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government. Her certifications include: Certified Mediator recognized by the National Association of Certified Mediators, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program practitioner (HSEEP), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Master Exercise Practitioner Program (MEPP) Series 21.

Missy T. Gillespie, Principal, SmoothStone Consulting, LLC.

Missy is an executive communications strategist with extensive experience working in higher education, nonprofits and government. She is a founding partner and senior executive coach of Smooth Stone Consulting whose mission is to prepare people to get to the next level. SSC specializes in targeting core problems and addressing symptoms, while developing solutions that align with organizational mission and goals. This work is accomplished by utilizing a method designed by the founding members. Missy focuses on developing individuals, teams and organizations by understanding the "why" behind their work and helping leaders develop the skills necessary to leave a sterling professional and personal legacy.

Missy understands the importance of communication to an individual and an organization. Having dealt with issues such as racial profiling on the New Jersey Turnpike, teen violence, election misconduct and sharing the message of a successful campaign, she recognizes the power and impact of words. She is an active listener who understands difficult and emotional situations.

Prior to founding SSC, Missy served as a principal of the Gillespie Group, a professional services firm; she served as director of operations at Princeton University's Office of Communications; she was appointed executive director of operations for the New Jersey Secretary of State, where she also acted as the Director of Communications; and, she served as an elections specialist at the Utah Governor's Office. Missy has a Master of Science in organizational dynamics from the University of Pennsylvania and a Bachelor of Science in political science from the University of Utah.

Specialties: Communications, Discovering and Retaining Talent, Diversity, Executive Coaching, Interpersonal Skills, Leadership, Organizational Diagnosis, Program Management, Strategic Planning, Team Building, Writing.

Lauren Ugorji, Principal, SmoothStone Consulting, LLC.

Lauren has extensive, diverse experience in managing complex communications issues, strategies and teams within education, political, nonprofit and corporate environments. She has a demonstrated record of success in global brand management, social media, media relations, video production, digital and print publications, crisis response, Web management and staff development. Recognized for expertise in innovating, creating collaborative networks and delivering mission-aligned results, Lauren is an excellent speaker, editor and writer. She has proven ability to attract and work well with diverse audiences.

Lauren most recently served as Associate Vice President for Communications, Marketing and Branding at NJIT and spent 14 years leading Princeton University's communications team as Assistant Vice President for Communications. Among other paths, she served as Assistant Secretary of State for the State of New Jersey, Executive Director and Press Secretary for the Boston School Committee and was an award-winning journalist who worked for the Boston Globe, Dallas Times-Herald, Newark Star-Ledger and wrote for Black Enterprise magazine.

Lauren holds a Master of Science degree from the Columbia University School of Journalism and a Bachelor of Arts in English from Princeton University, where she also was pre-med and holds certificates in African American Studies and Creative Writing. She has served as a coach and mentor to numerous professionals.

Specialties: Branding, Crisis Communications, Diversity, Editing, Executive Coaching, Leadership Development, Management, Marketing, Media Relations, Social Media, Strategic Planning, Team Building, Video, Web Management, Writing.

ATTACHMENT 8 – FIRM QUALIFICATIONS

Margolis Healy is a professional services firm specializing in campus safety, security, and regulatory compliance for higher education and K-12. We provide our clients with a variety of specialized services that include physical security assessments; Title IX and Clery Act compliance assessments and training; emergency management risk and hazard assessments; emergency preparedness and crisis response systems and exercises; implementation of lethal and less-than-lethal force options; litigation consultation and expert witness services; and special investigations/independent reviews.

Dr. Gary J. Margolis and Mr. Steven J. Healy founded Margolis Healy in 2008. With twenty years each of providing consulting services to clients in the education, public and private sectors, their combined experience quickly earned Margolis Healy recognition as one of the leading campus safety and security professional services firms in the United States. In 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance awarded the firm funding authorized by Congress to establish and operate The National Center for Campus Public Safety. In August 2017, Margolis Healy was acquired by the Philadelphia-based law firm Cozen O'Connor.

The Margolis Healy team has consulted or been intimately involved with numerous high profile cases. These include reviews, assessments and investigations at Penn State, The Citadel, Baylor University, and Umpqua Community College, to name a few. Shortly after the August 2017 "Unite the Right" rally that turned deadly in Charlottesville, VA and the unplanned white supremacists march through the Grounds of the University of Virginia on Friday, August 11, UVA retained Margolis Healy to conduct a comprehensive review of campus safety and security systems, policies, procedures, and practices.

We have worked tirelessly to assemble the best and brightest in the campus safety, security and regulatory compliance fields in order to provide our clients with outstanding service. The level of professionalism and breadth of experience each member of the Margolis Healy team brings allows us to provide each of our clients with personalized attention and high-quality work.

The MHA Methodology

Margolis Healy and Associates serves our clients through the development of a Risk Tolerance Profile that assists the institution with identifying the range of realistic threats and vulnerabilities it faces, and then implementing a decision making process to determine which

require prevention, mitigation and/or response plans. Without such a process, universities and colleges face the daunting task of giving equal attention to all perceived and real threats. Our process recognizes the range between high impact/low probability and low impact/ high probability events. The active shooter tragedy (high impact/ low probability) and the iPod theft from the library (low impact/high probability) each require different strategies. Impact is defined through the institution and the individual.

MHA has developed a unique, proprietary methodology for evaluating safety and security needs at institutions of higher education based on years of educational campus safety and security experience, research, reflection and evaluation. We assess safety and security at educational institutions through our proprietary 3 Circles of Prevention System.™ We have extensive proprietary checklists that support our methodology.

The First Circle asks to what extent relationships and services exist for early interception and intervention for problems and issues germane to faculty, staff and students. Such services may include drug and alcohol education and counseling, behavioral threat assessment teams, grievance policies, workplace violence policies and prevention systems, sexual assault, stalking and domestic violence victim advocacy; mediation services and grievance policies and procedures for faculty and staff; and other similar policies and services that address problems before they become a crisis.

The Second Circle explores the extent to which institutions of higher education have employed physical obstacles, delaying tactics and security technology to control, secure or regulate access to the physical plant. This may include systems that direct vehicular traffic; security cameras; networked or standalone door locking systems and hardware; campus lighting (interior and exterior); E911 capacity and PBX phone systems; mass notification systems (high and low technology); fire and life safety systems; visitor management policies and practices; inclusion of crime prevention through environmental design considerations; and access control and other security technology tools.

The Third Circle explores measures that enable the institution to respond to events and security and safety related needs in an organized, timely, and efficient manner. This may include a public safety function with organized involvement of students, faculty and staff in the security of the campus; memoranda of understanding with area police, fire and emergency medical services; emergency response and recovery systems, policies and procedures that have been trained to; and adoption and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS)

MARGOLIS HEALY

and the Incident Command System (ICS). Combined, this third circle of prevention builds capacity for the human response to safety and security requirements.

Taken together, the various strategies depict the interconnected nature of campus safety and security. Changes or decisions made to one area impact the others. The deployment of security technology (cameras, door prop alarms, controlled access points) may or may not have an effect on the number of public safety officers, which may or may not impact other security needs. MHA works with our clients to develop a reasonable campus safety and security program based on their current state and the desired future state.

The measures taken to address safety and security are as much data and metrics driven as they are based on perception. We believe that our expertise, knowledge and experiences uniquely qualify us to assist our client institutions with recommendations tuned to their culture and needs.

THE INTERCONNECTED NATURE OF CAMPUS SAFETY & SECURITY STRATEGIES ™

SAN MATEO COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT   133
PUBLIC SAFETY MANAGEMENT STUDY AND SAFETY & SECURITY PROGRAM ASSESSMENT